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VIII/78/75.:i 
COMMISSION COMMUNICATION TO THE COUNCIL 
on the arr~ements made to ensure that contracts 
financed b,y the European Developnent Fund are placed 
on equal terms 
Introduction 
The Treaty of Rome, the Association Conventions, the Financial Regulations 
and the Commission's Implemeting Regulations 1~ down that the principle 
to be followed for the conclusion of contracts financed b,r the European 
Development Fund (EDF) is to issue open international invitations to tender 
for all works and supDly oontraots to be-carried out far the benefit of 
1\ •• k 
the States, Countries "and Territories associated with the EEO. 
c 
I" 
~ The organization of a competitive procedure was considered of prime importance 
1 
for carrying out the operations under the best conditions. This choice was 
dictated first of all b,y what is common practice throughout the world for 
publio contracts: this practice is based on the fact that competition 
between a number of interested parties enables the best prices to be obtained. 
Sound ~anagement of public monies, both in the develop~d and developing 
. ' -
countries, requires that projects be exe.cuted at the l~west cost. Such a 
policy was also inspired by' the desire t,o prevent the F:cystallization of 
monopoly positions b,y means of opening up contracts to.wider competition 
among firms~ Finally, it waa found that competition enabled the recipient 
~ ooun1riea' ettorta to be supplemented b,r foreign teohnologr in auoh a w~ 
r , 
that a fair balance of services is achieved in relation to the oapaoit7 of 
each party. 
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On various occasions the Member States have expressed their desire to be 
given the fullest possible information on the trend of results ·of 
invitations to tender for projects financed from the Fund's resources. 
This desire led them to prescribe a num~r of initiatives for the Commission 
to take with this objective in mind. 
" The first step was taken under Regulation No 5 of the Council of 2 December. 
1958, Article 20 of which recommended annexing to the annual accounts and 
balance sheet of the first Fund a .summar,y ·or· the ·resu~ts .. of 'th-' Tear's 
invitations to tender. 
The Financial Regulation relating to the second Fund, dated 1 June 1964, 
established more preofse information procedures: Articte 47(4) of the 
Regulat!on requests tlie Commission to notify the Council ever.r six months 
of the outcome of the invitations to ten&.er and to infdrm the Council, if 
necessary, of the measures it has taken ~r proposes to take in order to 
ensure that the principle of equality of~terms for pariicipation in 
invitations to tender~is respected. 
Article 49(4) of the Financial Regulatioh relating to the third EDF, dated 
26 J anuar;r 1971, was drawn up with similar terms to thi preceding provision. 
It re-introduced the principle of results being notifi6d on an annual basis 
and also indicated the extent of the information that the Commission might 
, I 
be required to present to the Council. If the results done - and nothing 
more -are notified a'more detailed examination is sometimes required: it 
i, I 
is for this reason th&t the Commission is called upon io provide in its 
report information which will enable the 1 Council to asse~s whether the 
measures it has taken have had the effeo\ of giving ali the firms of the 
Member States and the'Associated States,~Oountries.and Territories equal 
aooess to works and ~PP~ contracts fi~oed b.y the ~. 
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With this in mind and in response to the interest shown b,y the Member 
States, it is intended: in this report to take stock in the light or 
experience ga~ned from three Funds and in as exhaustive a manner as ··· 'e 
possible, or the results obtained in respect or participation in EDF 
contracts. 
The first considerations b,y whioh the Comm~ssion was guided were dictated, 
as has aire~ been stated, b,y the objeoiive o_r the "beist prioe" and, as 
a result, the desire to see that contracts are awarded under the most 
advantageous eoonomic ~onditions. 
Equally important, moreover, were considerati'ons regarding the question 
of the balance which o01.1ld be achieved in the distribution or tenders b;r 
nationality. As emphaSized in the above~entioned Article 49 or the 
1971 Fin$.ncial Regulation, the measures taken by· the Cokmission must ena,ble 
the economic resqurces or each Member St~te and of each Associated State, 
.. 
I e , Countr,y and Territor, to be used with optimum effectiveness. ·A satistactor,y 
balance would refleot participation by Europe's wealth as a whole, especially 
through its contribution or technology, in the development effort or the 
associated countriesl • this objective correspon.Q.s both:ito a desire constantly 
affirmed by the Membe~ States in the wq in which they rhave guided the 
CammunitJ'a devolopmen~ poliqr and ~o the 4etire to .. ~~oiate na~ional 
firms of the countries receiving European aid with the execution ot the 
projects. 
For its part, the Commisston, as manager' or the Fund, has applied itself 
to using all the means available ~o it to further the pursuit or these 
objectives. The account of the measures'• adopteQ. under" the three P\mds 
~ 
should enable the efforts made to this end to be assesseQ. and then. 
oompared with the results achieved •. 
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The fact remains that achievement of an ideal balance still depends on 
. 
complex factors. Some'of them derive from the continuation of preferential 
relations which have evolved natural~ between Associated States and the 
former European colonial powers; others have stemmed from recent 
developments in the international economic situation (in particular 
currency movements). 
Thus, while following its own ideas on this ma~ter, the ,Commission considers 
it desirable to open a dialogue with the Member States and the Associated 
. ' States to examine what remains to be done in order to arrive at a better 
balance as regards participation, taking account in particular of the 
above-menti~ned factors. Not least among the aims of this report would 
be to help stimulate thought on this matter. 
All the same, it should be ·emphasized thi~ this report is an extensiou o~ an 
. I ;, ~ 
initiative alre~ taken b,y the Commission a few years ago concerning 
information on measures to improve the t~rms governing participation in 
the Fund's contracts. t It is the third of a series of communications 
presented to the Council by the Co•ission under the above-mentioned articles . 
of the respective Fi~ci&l Regulations relating to the second and third EDFs. 
The first report, publ~shed in 1966 (Doc.' Sec 66-1415),~ set out all the 
measures adopted from the start of the first Fund's operations with the aim 
of removing obstacles in law or in fact which might hi~er participation 
in the in'ri tat ions to 'tender by firms of'· one Member State or another. It 
also examined the statistics on the distribution of' the contracts f'inanoed 
b,y the Fund and found a relative imbalance, which the Oommi11.sion proposed 
to remed¥• 
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I 
The second report, commu,rp.cated to the Council in 1968 (Doc. SEC(68.~394) 
following a Council Re'solution of 6 June '1967 on improving the conditions 
' 
of competition, surve,yed the measures that the Commission has taken or 
was proposing to take to this end. In the statistical part, it concluded 
that there was a much more ~atiataotor;r balance than at the time of the 
first report, particular~ tor the contracts under the second Fund. 
The report presented bere comes at a turning point in t.he development of 
contracts financed by the EDF. 
On the one hand, the various Funds in f9rce have provided mucb management 
experience, from which a number of lessons may be learned. Contracts under 
the first Fund •re toa..y virtually clot~ed and thol!le under the second Fund 
' have nearly all been ~Warded. 
' . 
As for th' third Fund, it has so to speak 
reached its fUlly operation•l stage. We can therefore go badk far enough 
to make interesting co'm:p~risons based on,-consolidation 'Or what has 
been· achieved and a set of new measures 'carried out toi implement the second 
Yaound~ "Convention. Iit will, moreover, be recalled - to give an idea of 
numbers~ that 1 250 i~vitations to tender have been issued from the start 
and that the funds available under the third EDF are such that the issue 
of approximately seventy more invitation• to tender carl be envisaged~ 
On the other hand, the Association. is on the verge of see~ng the fourth 
Fund introduced, whicll, because of enlar~ment, will receive a much greater 
amount of aid than the three preceding Fands, as well. as inc~eased and 
strengthened means of acti9n, which will in particular 'inake ~ t possibl~ to 
ensure wider participation by the national firms or the: benefioi~ 
countries in the execution ot dev,lopment pro~eota. . .. 
I 
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The amount of the fourth Fund, considerably increased compared with 
the third, will arouse. interest in industrial crrcles, which might 
participate on a much greater scale than previously. The Commission's 
task of ensuring that there is a. better balance as regards participation 
by nationals of the different Member and Associated Couatries will tend 
to become wider. The considerably increased political importance of the 
new Association, compared with the previous Association, cannot but stimulate 
the desire of the Governments of the Memoer and Associated States to improw 
. 
the value of their respective contributions by actively bringing to bear in 
the execution of projects the weight of their human and technical resources. 
This twofold consideration - experience of more than fifteen years and the 
prospect of enlargement - therefore makes it particularly necessary to have 
information on the methods for ensuring that partioipat~on in EDF contracts 
is on equal terms. 
To this end, this repo~ intends, in Chapter I, to recall all the principles 
which have been ad~pted for organizing invitation to tender procedures, and, 
in Chapfer II, to analyse the results obtained on the ~asia of the statistical 
data regarding participation and the placing or contracts. 
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CHAPTER I 
Principles adopted for or5anizing 
·invitation to tender procedures 
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Among the texts governing the award and performance of public contracts 
financed by the EDF the basic provisions concerning invitations to 
tender remain Article 132(4) of the Treaty of Rome (first EDF), Article 25 
of the first Yaound~ Convention (second EDF) and Article 26 of the second 
Yaound~ Convention {third EDF). 
Apart frem a few differences in :the wording, the oommon"denominator of 
the three articles is the provision that participation in tenders shall 
be open to firms that are nationals of the Member States and Associated 
States, Countries and Territories on equal terms. 
The basic principle thus enshrined constttutes an objective with regard 
to which the Commission - in order to attain it - has had to find its way 
without knowing to begtn with the extent 'of the obstacles to be overcome. 
Experience alone has revealed these obstacles and made rapid and effective 
adjustments necessary.' 
Thus the~provisions laid down and specified over the years in Article 20 
of Regulation No 5 of the Council {first FUnd), Article 47{2) and {3) of the 
i 
I 
i ~ 
.. 
n 
Financial Regulation relating to the seoohd Fund and Article 49(1 ), {2) and: "· 
(3) of the Financial Regulation relating to the third Fbnd reflected the 
results of experience and the major obligations whioh the Commission had entered 
into on its own initiative. 
More details of these provisions will be given below in': the summary of the 
various principles and measures adopted by the Commissibn for organizing 
invitation to tender procedures. 
It should, however, be emphasized that, once the principle of working towards 
free aooess to contracts on equal terms had been fixed, the Commission al~ 
enjoyed considerable freedom of action. 
.·. 
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The Commission was certainly not starting from scratch, to the extent 
that it was able to find food for thought in the procedure in force in 
the States which were party to the Association or in the practices followed 
by other international organizations, or even draw upon the work carried 
out in other sectors of the Community's activities. 
Moreover, the Commission has not worked in isolation: ~the rules applied 
to EDF contracts were alw~s drawn up only after wide consultation with 
the interested parties, in particular the firms, through their professional 
groups. 
It is nevertheless a fact that the wide room for manoeuvre available to. 
the Commission was the key to undeniable efficiency since it enabled the 
Commission to perfect~ the existing models and create original instruments 
adapted to its activities in order to meet both the in~erests of recipients 
and the aspirations of firms. A sign of this trend isRthat the extensive~ 
and 1i vely discussions of the early years of EDF activity on a number of 
guidelines adopted by the Commission have not recurred since. Fbr years 
there has been no complaint about the basis of the principles governing 
publio contracts fin~ced by the EDF. 
Thus it would not be an exaggeration to·. claim that the·· Comrinmi ty's 1 
invitation to tender procedures are today the most appropriate of 
the methods of international development cooperation. 
~--------·-1'- ---· ....... ·--
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The principles involved govern each stage of the invitation to 
tender. 
Some are concerned with the preparation and the actual issue of 
the invitation to tender in such a wa;s- as to provide the best 
,., .. ... ,. 
conditions for the preparation of tenders. ~ese principles have 
been supplemented by measures for rationalizing the presentation 
of invitations to tender. 
other rules relate to the selection of the contractor and are 
designed to en~re maximum objectivity in the assessment and 
comparison of tenders. 
However; account must~also be taken of a set of corrective measures 
taken regarding all these rules in view of the nature of the projects 1 
here it can be seen that the Commission is concerned with achieving some 
kind of·' balance between national and foieig.n firms so that each m&\Y' plq 
a part 'according to its size and its capabilities. 
Finally, certain rules drawn up by the Commission, although not directly 
concerned with the procedure for awarding contracts, nevertheless have 
r 
an effect on the terms offered to :firms to make oontraots financed by the m' more 
attractive. This is particularly the case for the cla.Uses in :force in 
respect of pa:s-ment. 
All these measures have been implemented in various forms according to 
the body of rules and regulations available to the ooJdssion. However, 
it should be partioularll' emphasized that moat of thei• rule• and 
i' 
principles have bean established via patient oodif'ioat\on b7 the Oomm!11ion. 
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It is this "legislative" aspect that will have to be concentrated on 
first of all. 
This chapter, built around the ideas which have just been set out, will 
therefore develop the following points: 
1. codification of the rules applicable to EDF oontraots, 
2. principles for the preparation of invitation to tender dossiers, 
3• principles involved in the procedure for issuing invitations to 
tender, 
4• measures taken to rationalize the presentation of invitation to 
tender dossiers, 
5· rul~s governing selection of the contractor, 
6. measures to ensure a balanced sharing of work between firms established 
in the country concerned and foreign firms, 
7• rules for the performance of contracts to ensure indirectly that the 
terms are equal. 
,, 
1.1 Codification of the rules applicable to EDF contrects 
The first fUndamental, achievement of this long and exapting work remains 
the drawing up of a single General Specification for public works and 
supply contracts financed by the EDF. 
In its second communication to the Council, the Commis,sion had alre~ 
emphasized the importance of drawing up ~eneral Speoifi~ations which 
at that time existed ,in draft form. ,, 
I 
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Since then, the draft has been endorsed by the high authorities of the 
Association: 
Decision No 42/71 of the Association Council of 30 November 1971 
(OJ No L/39 of 14 February 1972) brought the text of the General 
Specifications into force for the AASM' 
Decision No 73/313 of the Council of. the EUropean Communi ties of 
24 July 1973 (OJ No L/287 of 14 October 1~73) enabled an identical 
measure to be taken in order to app1Y the General Specifications to 
the OCT. 
The general specifications take the form of 137 articles grouped under 
two ti t'les having different legal applioation. ,J 
Title I comprises regulations from which the interested parties would not 
be abltl to derogate through agreements they might enter into. This 
limitation of the rights of the contracting parties i~ in accordance with 
the idea of drawing up "rules of the g~e" that eqtabl~sh~._~certain principles 
and defini tiona, organize the procedure for preparing and awarding contracts 
and lay down the method for settling disputes. The Obmmission is thus 
assured that rules considered as fundamental for obse~ng fair competition 
will be applied. 
Title II, on the other hand, consists of contractual clauses·which 
represent a model for specifications, adaptable and modifiable as required 
in accordance w1 th a apeoif'io contract. These proviai1one govem mainlT 
the procedure for the performance of contracts. Some are common to 
works and supply contracts 1 others relate exolusi vely -to works contracts; 
and final1y others relate specifically 1to supply contracts. 
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The details of some of these clauses will be indicated below in 
the summary of particular measures adopted to comply with the 
conditions of competition. 
Prominence should be given here to the substantial progress represented 
by the entry into force of such a document, particularly from the point 
of view of improving the conditions of competition. 
{a) As regards content, the General Specifications have answered 
the desire expressed by firms for some years for standardization 
of the conditions applicable to public contracts financed by the EDF. 
The earlier report (1968) mentioned above set out the difficulties of 
every kind (mass of regulations, complexity of procedures, language 
barriers' etc.) which contractors and suppliers come up;against 
because of the differerit laws governing the award and execution of 
contracts in the associated countries. Without going back over this 
point, it is important 'to stress that the standardization achieved by 
the new General Specifications provides firma with clear l~gal 
guarantees, better enabling them to asae~s the conditions of an overseas 
operation. The most conclusive result is that foreign firms no longer 
have to overestimate in their tenders the risks involved due to the 
existence of a great number of differing national rules with Which they 
are unfamiliar. This result is of no small consequence; from the point 
n 
of view of reducing project execution costs. Furthermore, the immutability 
of the clauses relating to the preparation and award of. contracts is 
regarded as a very real guarantee that equal terms will be observed. 
This guarantee is strengthened by the fact that the General Specifioa.tions 
are available in the official languages of the Communit~.~ 
I 
I 
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Firms are thus required to become increasingly familiar with a document 
the modern nature of which is beginning to show its worth. Not content 
with merely borrowing from regulations existing in the Member States and 
the associated countries, the Commission was concerned to improve the 
instrument by adapting it to cater for shortcomings in the conditions 
under which public contracts are currentlY prepared and carried out; 
finally, it made use of the most recent work done on this subject by the 
Community authorities. ~> 
(b) The scope of the General Specifications reveals undoubted · progress 
in the ~ in which public contracts are regulated at international level • 
Measures have been taken to insert the General Specifications in the 
national legislation of each Associate~ State and in the legal system 
of the Community. This pQint is important, for it de~onstrates that 
the q·eneral Specifications are not a mere reference document drawn up 
by third parties, which mey be resorted to as an auxiliary measure. On 
the contrary, the new general provisions are part of hational regulations 
in the same way as t~ts intended to govern domestic bontracts and are 
applicable, as texts of national law, to contracts fihanced by the EDF. 
The latter contracts' can therefore be concluded and carried out with 
respect for national sovereignty but at the same time following a common 
.. 
model. ,, 
The General Specifications thus represent represents a work of.oodifioation, the 
advantages of which ~hould not be underestimated) 
I. 
1 c , 
Enlargement of the Association will lead to the preRaration of a 
new text taking into account the special features o~ the system 
traditionally in force in English-spe~ing countrie~. Since the 
drawing up and negotiation of this new version of the general 
specifications wilt be a lengthy task; transitional b.rrangements 
will be made. The present Associated;States will continue to apply 
to EDF contracts the common text now in force, while. the newly 
Associated States will apply their respective na.tiori~l laws and 
practices, except, however, where allY' ,provision discriminates against · 
.the Association. 
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After all, this undertaking is part of a wider framework which the 
Commission has resolved to set up, aimed at drawing up a code of 
practice for EDF contracts. 
Thus, mention may be made here of: 
(a) The establishment of general provisions tG govern service contracts 
(stu~, technical assistance and works supervision contracts). 
Originally conceived as a job of putting in order EDF practices in these 
matters, the preparation of these documents benefited from the precedent 
constituted by the General Specifications. 
These provisions have been applied on an expP.rimental basis to technical 
assistance and works supervision contracts since March 1972, and to study 
contracts'since April 1973. 
It is possible that the Commission might combine the three documents 
" 
at a later stage into a common text with specific clauses for the various 
types of contract. Such a document would have to go through the same stages 
of discussion and adoption as were employed in negotiating the General 
Specifications. The document in question will, however, be quite distinct 
from the latter. 
(b) The finalizing of rules of arbitration to assist in settling 
disputes which might arise between the administration and the tenderer 
or contractor. 
Recourse to this procedure had already been adopted as a means of settling 
disputes under the second FUnd Via an arbitration clause'inoluded in all 
financing agreements, giving jurisdiction to the Court of Arbitration of 
the International Chamb1er of Commerce. 
I 
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However, a decisive step was taken with the General Speoifications, Article 55 
of which explicitly entrusts the Association Council with the task of drawing 
up rules of arbitration. 
The Commission has now prepared· a draft a it has made use of or been gu.ided 
by an important body of highly authoritative texts, in particular the IBRD 
Convention of 18 March 1965. 
" 
The main feature of the draft, following modern trends in arbitration law, 
has been to ins.ti tutionalize much of the procedure with a view to achieving 
a simple and effective means of settling disputes between parties. Its 
institutional character does not, however, exclude oonsensual aspects on 
certain matters. 
It should be stressed'that this draft, which is a new aspect of the 
standardization of law in relations between the administrations of the 
associated countries and the firms participating in EDF contracts, is 
primarily intended to speed up the settlement of disputes which sometimes i 
arise in large and difficult contracts: , it is therefore a notable faotor 
as regards promoting the expansion of competition. 
This draft will come to fruition under the new association, since the 
texts governing the fourth EDF provide for the entry ihto foroe of rules 
of arbitration. 
1.2 Principles for the preparation of invitation to tender dossiers 
The Commission has endeavoured to provide firms with invitations to 
tender which are as comprehensible and complete as possible. This aim springs 
from the desire to make it easier for firms to draw up ·tenders and from the 
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need to provide for firms which are not very familiar with the language 
in which the dossier is drawn up, a text that can be easily translated. 
FUrthermore, this approach was determined by the desire to ensure that 
the contractual nature of the contracts is fully respected. This explains 
the importance attached to the use of the written word to establish ~ite 
clearly the conditions applicable to the contracts. This policy is intended 
to inspire confidence in firms and encourage them, as a result, to take part 
' in the proposed project. 
1.2.1 The documents contained in the invitation to tender dossier are in line 
with the practice normally followed in such matters. 
Apart from the documents drawn up for publicity or information purposes 
(see below), there are two contractual documents governing the procedure 
for contracts s 
i. th'e General Specifications, which oonsti tute the general regulations 
covering the preparation, award and execution of EDF contracts. The 
content and scope of this basic document have been explained abovef ~ 
ii. the Special Conditions, which determine the detailed rules for each 
contract. These are technical and administrative clauses containing 
specifications which supplement the General Specifications and m~, 
in certain circumstances, derogate from the latter where the 
provisions are not binding. The technical part of the Special 
Conditions is usually accompanied by general or detailed plans 
or drawings intended to clarify the nature of the' services re~ired 
from the contractors. 
In addition, for a unit price contract the invitation to tender dossier 
1 
includes an outline price list and an outline itemized estimate which 
tenderers are required to complete as a means of indicating what is 
contained in their tender. 
'• 
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The assessment and comparison of tenders are thereby facilitated. 
1.2.2 These documents present certain problems with regard to the 
details of contract specifications. 
(a) Care was taken in drawing up the General Specifications not to give 
too narrow a definition of the qu.ali ty of services. This is why provision 
was made for the submission of variant solutions. 
During discussions with professional organizations, the usefulness from 
. 
the firms' point of View of submitting variations was repeatedly stressed, 
in so far as the complexity of the techniques involved and the specialization 
of EUropean industry made it necessary to provide for such a possibility in 
" ' order to achieve, in certain oases, the best suited and most economical 
solution. Moreover, such a policy undoubtedly serves the interests of 
the party for whom the contract is to be performed if that party is.astute 
enough to look upon the contractor not as an opponent but as a collaborator. 
(b) With regard to competition, the Commission on many occasions came up 
against the delicate problem of neutratity in definipg the services to be~ 
rendered, particularly as ·regards supplies. 
There are pitfalls to be avoided on both sides. On the one hand, excessively 
detailed specifications involves a considerable risk of restricting competition 
by stipulating, at one extreme, a specific product. On the other hand, 
general a description m~ make tenderere hesitate or decline to tender, 
' 
given the complexity ot the techniques involved and the variety ot ;oode 
too 
' I. 
on. the market. The best procedure when drawing up i~vi tat ions to tender 
is thus to find a happy compromise -between too VSB~le a description and too 
I 
I 
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precise a definition. 
To this end the Commission m~ use one of several methods, depending on 
the circumstances. 
Where goods are standardized on an international scale (dimensions, shape, 
weight, proportion of constituent elements,. etc.), the Commission likes to 
use such a system of reference. Thus the al~gnment of technical 
specifications carried out at Community level under "Ehronorm" is very 
useful in this respect - particularly since publications in this field are 
readily available to firms. Similarly, to take a very specific seotor,~ 
the work done on harmonization under the Community transport policy has 
led to a widening of competition in the field of vehicle supplies. 
In di.fficult cases, the Commission seeks advice and technical collaboration 
from impartial experts or specialists from professiobal organizations. Thus, 
as regards fertilizers, this method led to a standardized impartial description 
based on the purpose and use of the supplies requested. 
In all oases, the Commission takes care to include itt the invitation to ~ 
tender dossier the provision that any materials or supplies that will 
. 
serve the same purpose as those specified or referred to m~ be proposed. 
1.2.3 With regard to the method of preparing invitation to tender 
dossiers, the principle is that they are drawn up by the national 
authorities of the hssooiated country benefiting from an ~peration under 
the Fund. 
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This principle fits in with the rationale of the association; this 
implies that it is the Governments of the Associated States and, where 
I 
appropriate, their institutions and other specialized bodies, which are 
responsible for the execution of projects. 
The complexity of the techniques involved has, however, led to this 
principle being accompanied by additional cooperation arrangements. 
" ~ 
(a) Generally speaking, before any invitation to tender is issued it is 
examined by the EDF from the technical, legal and financial angles. 
This practice provides an additional guarantee that the principle of 
1 . " 
equal terms will be observed. It depends on close collaboration between 
the Commission oand its on-the-spot representatives (the Commissian 'Delegates). 
(b) Where there is:: some doubt as to the method to be applied, invitations 
to tefider with competition are issued. These requi~e the tenderers them-
eel ves to stud3r and propose the best solution to meet the requirements ot 
the country concerned. 
(c) Where projects are of a certain size or involvi an advanced 
technology, the Commission finances study contracts·ooncluded by the 
administrations of the Associated States with firms ~f consultant 
engineers in order to draw up the invitation to tender dossiers. These 
consultants are-also responsible for ~ransmitting the dossiers to the 
firms that are interested and remain 'at their dispossal tor any additional 
information the latter m~ required. ' 
In this field it is essential to ascertain the quali~y of the services '1 
I ' 
rendered and the impartiality of the bonsulting engiheers chosen. 
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The Commission therefore possesses substantial supervisor,r powers 
at two stages : 
.i~ When the consultanoy firm is chosen, through the part plavred by 
the Chief Authorizing Officer of the Fund in the procedure for 
appointing and approving the contractor. 
In this connection the Commission h~ available a wide selection 
of qualified firms that are nationals of the member or associated 
countries and possess sufficient international experience to be able 
n 
to take into consideration the whole range of current techniques when 
drawing up the dossier. The Commission t~es particular care to ensure ( 
that only those firma which do not have any interests in any given under-
takirtgs are chosen! This1 moreover, ~akes it easier to achieve a degree 
of b~lance between nationalities in the distribution of contracts 
awarded for studies financed by the Fund. 
ii. When the invitation to tender dossier is being drawn up, the studies 
are scrutini~ed by the Commission and the' Commission Delegatej who are 
entitled by the terms of the contract to inte~ene at any time, 
in particular to oheok that th~ dossier takes! account of various 
local factors. 
The most striking result of this system has been that the fairly large 
number of complaints made before the start of the second EDF (1965) 
about the impartiality of the oonsul ta.nt engineers And discriminator,r r' 
elements in certain invitation to tender dossiers, have nowadays become · 
very rare. 
. .. 
1.3 f!inciples involved in the procedure for issuing invitations to tender 
The Commission has made great efforts to see that invitations to tender,, 
are issued under conditions which will ensure that participants are 
placed on equal terms • 
I 
I 
:• 
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Here there were at least three objectives to be attained: that of 
ensuring the widest possible publicity, that of facilitating the 
submission of tenders and that of rationalizing the rate at which 
invitations to tender are issued. 
1.3.1 With regard to 'publicity, it beo~e clear that priority should 
be given to recognizing the importance attached by firms to being 
informed in good time. and in sufficient detail of all the major factors 
required to enable them to participate in carr.ying out a project. 
For this reason the Commission made a serious effort to develop a 
system to provide the fUllest possible information, based on three 
elements: the publicizing of projects, of the aotual invitations to 
tender, 'and of the outcome of the invitations to tende~. 
1.3.1.1 Publicizing of projects 
Measures taken here are based on the idea that firms wish to have at 
their disposal as much information as possible on the progress of ,, 
operations financed by the FUnd so that they can devel~p their ow.n strategies 
and programme their aoti vi ties. This is especially true in the case of 
major infrastructure projects. 
This is why for each project the main stages of the procedure oall for 
particular publicity measures. 
r 
Thus the financing decisions taken by the Commission aft&r the EDF 
Committee opinion are published in the Official Journal of the Ehropean 
Communities as a Note which indicates not only What the project conaiata 
of and the amount of money earmarked for it , but also g:i. ves a fUll account 
of the various services required to oarr,Y it out and d~tails of how they 
are to be implemented. This information is supplemented by a press' 
release distributed by the Community's Spokesman's Group and taken up 
I' • 
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by the news agencies, newspapers, etc., in the Member States and 
associated countries. 
Similarly, the studies awarded to consultancy firms are announced by 
the Commission in broch~res giving a progress report on projects. 
These brochures themselves have a wide circulation. Such studies 
represent the initial"approa.ch to a project and are draw.n up several 
months before the call for tender, enabling those in the industries 
concerned to follow the progress of the project and put their point· 
of view to those responsible for it. 
1 .3.1.2 Publicizin.s of invitations to tender 
The importance attached to publici zing tnvi tat ions to tender mS\Y' be 
' ' ' j 
gauged by the nwnber of texts which stipulate that it is required. 
The main method of publicizing invi tatio:ns to tender remiUns notification 
through the press in the form of the nciice of invitation to tender. 
This provides information on the purpose of the contraet, the location 
and the time allowed i"or providing the l:lervices, the terms on which the 
dossiers are made available and tenders are to be submitted and examined, 
as well as the condi t'ions for taking part in the invitation to tender. 
This information package leads to the notices of invitation to tender 
being given very wide, publicity. They .. are published simultaneously 
in the Official Journal of the I!hropean Communities {i.e.Jin the six 
official la.ngu.ages of the Communi ties) and in the Offi1cial Journal of 
the beneficiary state·, country or terri tory. 'l'hey are also notified 
by the Government of the beneficiary state or country to the consular 
1 Article 20 of Council Regulation No 5t Article 47(2) ·~f the Financial 
Regulation of the second EDF, Article 49(2)(a) of therF1nancial · 
Regulation of the third EDF, Article IX of the Gener~l Provisions for 
Financing Agreements \Ulder the second and third EDF, Article 18 of .the 
General Specifications. r. 
«.,.3 4&£ At?; 4 (. ac JA !A ;" ) !2 ,_¥ Jh 4 SSQ _Ill .30¥ !II A t , i 
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representatives of the Member States and Associated States and Countries· 
established in that state or country. Any amendment to the notices of 
invitation to tender is published under the same conditions. In addition, 
various trade and professional publications in the Member States and the 
Associated States, Countries and Territories have started printing such 
notices and. amendments. 
In addition to the ~otice of invitation to tender mechanism - and again ~ 
wi. th the intention of enabling firms to become acquainted in good time 
with the nature of the services to be provided - the Commission has 
arranged for the invitation to tender dossier to be available for consultation 
locally, in Brussels and in the chief"industrial centres in Europe. ) 
Finaliy, the Commis~ion has adopted twb sets of mea~res to supplement 
the information available to firms on the local oondi tiona for ca:rr,ying · · 
out the services: ~ l 
,I l 
i.) For information purposes in respect of works colitracts, the 
invitation to 'tender includes a "General Information Sheet" 
brought up to date at the time of publication or distribution 
of the invitation to tender, and containing two ~parts: · 
general practical information, such as: geographical notes, 
notes on ~he climate, moneta.r,y system and cr~zation of 
banks, means of access; 
I 
factors wi th1 a direct financial incidence on ~he calculation 
of unit prices: fiscal and customs arrangements, labour and 
wage rates, social security charges, the cost of transport, 
construction materials, energy and water, the 'cost of living. 
This General Information Sheet is drawn up with the purpose of providing 
outside firms with information already possessed by 1,looal firms • It 
is an important fac~or for ensuring that the condi tiona of oompeti -eion . 
are observed. 
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ii~ For works projects of a sufficient size, site visits and 
sessions to provide additional information are organized 
for interested parties by the national administration. 
This procedure perm.i ts., in particular, discussion of technical, 
administrative and financial points which are essential for 
calculating the prices. 
The sife visits, when well organized add well oonduct~d, have 
. 
produced very good results in various respects. On-the-spot 
examination of all the difficulties which might arise during 
execution of the project, together with clarification of conditions 
existing as regards labour, wages, transport, the quality of local 
materials, etc., enable prices to be calculated with full knowledge of 
the facts. In this *~ a situation is ~voided whereby tenderers 
unacquainted or less familiar with such~ factors buildJinto their 
calculations a contingency margin which increases the~ cost of the 
projec't. Furthermore, these joint visits help to create an atmosphere 
of trust between the fUture contracting parties who during such visits 
join in detailed dis'Cu.ssions on how the works are to be carried out and 
adopt their positions on this basis. Finally, site visits enable a 
better assessment to' be made as to whether the various firms involved 
are genuinely competing with one another or are tending rather to 
reach agreements among themselves on certain points. It is often 
uncertainty regarding the condi tiona of execution, in so far as it 
prevents prices bei~ accurately calculated, which is' the source of 
agreements between firms. I, 
It should be added that again in order to ensure optimum 
conditions of competition the Commission has arranged to have a report 
' ,, 
drawn up at the conclusion of site visits and sent to' all firms which 
have displayed interest in the project~ The content's of this report 
form an integral part of the invitation to tender dossier and are thus 
given a contractual character. 
.c. 
I 
I 
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1.3.1.3 Publication of the results of the invitations.to tender 
Initiated by the Commission in the early years of the EDF's activity, 
this practice has been sanctioned by the Financial Regulations relating 
to the second and third FUnds. 
Its primary objective is to supplement the information measures described· 
above with the publication of the final stage of the procedure for the 
placing of contracts. 
But it has also proved a useful means of informing firms involved in a 
subsidiary capacity, such as subcontractors, carriers, forwarding agents, 
I' 
etc., of the identity of the contractors, whom they can then contact 
to offer their services. 
1.3.2 To facilitate the submission ot tenders, a fairly flexible policy 
has been adopted in'the matter of time limits. 
These have been so calculated as to allow all interested firms of the 
Member States and the Associated States, Countries and Territories to 
compete, with account being taken of distance from the beneficiary country, 
the possible need fOr a translation, ~ investigations carried out on the 
spot and the forwarding time required for correspondence. 
Time limits have been fixed at four months for works' contracts and three" 
months for suppiy contracts as a normal rule. They tn8i}" be reduced in 
the case of accelerated procedures (see below). However, they m8i}" be 
extended in the case of invitations to tender with competition or where 
;, .I . justifiable complaints concerning a del~ in the forwarding of the 
invitation to tender dossier are lodged with the Commission1• 
1 ' It is mainly to avoid the inconvenie~ce of such del~s, occasionally 
reported in the past, that the Commission has intro~uced the system 
of the direct sale· in EUrope of invitation to tender dossiers dra~ 
up by consultanoy firma (see above). 
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These time limits are considerably longer than those operating under 
procedures implemented under the aegis of other international financing 
bodies (in particular the World Bank). It must be stressed, however, that 
the EDF practice generally meets with the approval of firms • When adopting 
it the Commission was concerned to enable the latter to acquaint them-
selves more closely with the details of the work to be performed and thus 
prepare tenders with full knowledge of the faots. 
1.3.3 To rationalize the frequency of issue of invitations to tender, 
the Commission has programmed oertairi invitations to tender for works 
contracts. 
The objective pursued is above all to speed up the execution of projects -
and thereby reduce c6sts -by working oh the basis of1the idea that it can 
be hoped to avoid over-spending, which is often due to delays in the placing 
of works contracts, if the interval between the opening of the tenders and 
the approval of the project by the Community authorities is reduced to a 
minimum. I, ,, 
To this end, the programme drawn up starts from the ideal date for the 
commencement of work'' on the site ~verried by the climatic condi tiona) 
and works backwards ~ after deducting the periods all~wed for preparing tenders, 
selecting the contrabtor, signing the contract and transporting equipment -
to the date of is,sue of the invitation to tender, which must be as close 
as possible to the date on which the project is laid before the EDF Committee. 
The advantage of such planning is that projects are staggered so that the 1 
' tendering conditions can be fully competitive for each project. It also:. 
helps to eliminate wasted periods of time and occasionally even enables 
certain time limits to be dovetailed. 
I 
I 
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This sytem has been tried out with road projects, which are particularly 
dependent on climatic factors, and the results are encouraging. It will 
now be extended to other kinds of projects. 
To round off the system that has been introduced for information, the 
Commission could take the initiative of developing this programming 
operation into a means of informing firms and even of coordinating 
the rate of issue of invitations to tender to a certAin extent. 
Firms would thus be better equipped to meet their various obligations 
and to coordinate their services more effectively in a given geographical 
' ~ 
area, for it is well known that firms have a tendency, on account of the~ 
work involved in installing their staff and heavy equipment, to direct 
their activities to those regions which offer a succbssion of jobs either 
in one country or in a group of neighbouring countries. The assistance of 
the firms concerned can consequently be better secured if information 
is provided in good time and oovers several years. The extent to which 
increased participation helps to bring down the cost of operations cannot 
be overemphasized. 
1.4 Measures taken to rationalize the presentation of invitation 
to tender dossiers 
The action undertaken by the Commission to ensure that invitations to 
tender are prepared and issued under the best conditions has been supplemented 
by measures relating to the presentation of invitati~n to tender dossiers. 
Some of these· concern the standardization of certain·dossiers while othe;rs 
are connected with the practice of splitting contracts into lots. 
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1.4.1 In parallel with the work undertaken on codification as 
described above, emphasis has been laid on standardizing invitation 
to tender dossiers. 
The most positive results achieved in this field have been in respect 
of supplies. 
Technically, the system consists in drawing up a simplified dossier, 
which means that the majority of the contractual provisions generally 
constituting the invitation to tender dossier itself can be published in 
the Official Journal of the European Communities. These provisions are · 
) 1: 
so drafted as to provide tenderers with as much information as possible~ 
in their own language - on the components to be taken into account in 
calculating the amoU:nt of the tender; the main advahtage of such a 
system is that it ~acilitates the participation of a~large number of 
small and medium-sized firms which, although in a position to respond 
to the invitation to tender, it would otherwise virtually be impossible 
to reach. Providing fuller information for firms means that the usual 
time limit for submitting tenders can be considerably reduced as candida~es 
are left with a minimum- the technical part alone - to translate themselves. 
Tried out for the first time in 1964,' a system of this kind has gradually 
been extended to cover all supply contracts. 
It was last improve·d in June 1969, when the Commission split the document 
into two parts: Part A, which is variable and specific to each invi taticn 
to tender, describing the supplies and stating the Special Conditions, and 
Part B, which is standard and sets out the General Conditions common to 
invitations to tender for supply contracts. This standardization and 
simplification enables invitations to tender to be issued more rapid~ 
and in greater numbers. 
I 
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Thanks to this improvement, the administrations of the beneficiary countries 
have been able to speed up the drafting of dossiers, while the Commission's 
departments were able to rationalize the work of translation into the 
official languages of the EEC and that of publication, and it is now possible 
to issue invitations to tender immediately following reception of the 
technical details. 
It was only thanks to this sytem that it was possible to cope with the 
increase in the number of invitations to tender and, in specific oases, to 
r, 
ensure that orders were delivered on time. 
In 1973 almost all invitations to tender.for supplies were issued in aooordanoe 
with this simplified procedure. 
Encouraged by this oondlusive experiment in standardization for straightforward 
supply contracts, the Commission undertoo~ to extend it to composite 
contracts, that is supply contracts involving a considerable proportion of 4 
assembly work. Electrical installations in general are ian example, and the 
equipping of oil mills or tea factories also belongs to this category. 
For works contracts standardization mechanisms remain mdre delicate because 
of the complexity and specificity of work in this field •. 
However, the Commission is in contact with international bodies and various · 
national federations of public works firms to study waysland means of drafting. 
common technical specifications applicable to given types of contracts. Its 
departments are carefully watching developments following initiatives taken 
recently in connection with the drafting of common specifications for road r1 
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works in Africa. This research could be 1 combined, in the fairly near· 
future, with the efforts undertaken by the Commission to draw up standard 
special conditions and standard outline unit price lists· for each category 
of contract. The preparation of texts applicable to contracts financed 
by the EDF, while representing a further step towards codification, would 
provide usefUl reference standards for the presentation of invitation to 
tender dossiers. 
1.4.2 The second set of measures adopted by the Commission to rationalize 
the procedure for the issue of invitations to tender cdrresponds to a 
guideline laid down in Article 49(2)(c) of the Financial Regulation for 
the third EDF, according to which the Commission shall take steps to group 
invitations to tender in homogeneous lots which are as large as is 
economically and technically warranted, ~d to organizJ the issue of 
invitations to tender for operations to be carried out ~n neighbouring 
countries in such a way that it is possible to coordinate the performance 
of the contracts. 
The policy followed by the Commission in this field is in fact of relatively 
long standing. Alrea~ under the second Fund Artiole 28 of Commission 
Regulation No 62/65 laying down detailed rules for the functioning of the 
EDF stipulated that invitations to tende~ be grouped into lots which were 
as large as was economically and technically desirable• 
In the light of the foregoing, the following course of action has been 
adopted: 
(a) In general, the decision to split an invitation to tender into lots 
is governed by economic considerations (such as the ge~gTaphical situation) 
and technical factors (in particular to take account of 1the specialization 
involved). Here it is standard practice to enable candidates to tender 
for a single lot, several lots, or all the lots, so that each firm can f. 
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participate according to its scale; in addition, cost benefits can be 
obtained if the tenderers grant an overall rebate where certain lots 
are grouped together. 
(b) As regards works contracts, the practice of splitting into lots and 
grouping invitations to tender into homogeneous lots has made EDF contracts 
accessible to small and medium-sized fi~s and has thus constituted an 
" ' . important factor in the expansion of competition. 
In order to take account of geographical situations and to meet an 
efficiency requirement, the Commission is moreover endeavouring to group 
together in a single invitation to tender, subdivided into several lots, 
works of the same kind to be undertaken in regions which are very close to 
one anot"her; a further possibility woulfl be to have in\ritations to tender 
issued in close succession for works of the same type in one or several 
neighbouring countries. 
Such grouping or coordination of works also encourages :cooperation between 
. . 
firms, thus contributing to the attainment of an objective which the 
Commission set itself and which. it has e~ployed a number of specific means 
to reach (see below). 
(c) As regards supplies, the position adopted by the Commission is to 
invite tenders as far as possible for everything required for the execution 
of a given project or for all items which are sufficiently similar to be 
covered by a single invitation to tender. In other words, as with the 
neutrality of specifications (see above)·, the rule fori:the presentation 
" I 
of invitation to tender dossiers lies in finding the right balance between 
excessive dispersion and excessive concentration of lote: Consequently, 
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the Commission takes particular care with these grouping operati~. 
Occasionally based on geographical criteria, they prevent the dispersion 
of supplies of the same type earmarked for regions which border on one 
another but are situated in different associated countries. 
In addition, when making their choice, the Commission's departments are 
guided by the concern to take into account the structure of the industries 
involved, and particularly that of European in~ustries. The Commission 
was approached on numerous occasions during the early years of EDF activity 
and as a result its departments have come to acquire a fairly thorough 
knowledge of this structure, and the approach adopted - splitting or 
grouping - is decided accordingly. 
To complete the package of measures for rationalizing the grouping of lots 
of supplies, the Commission recently began to study the possibility of 
placing orders spread over several years following an invitation to tender. 
The advantage of such a system would be to achieve a balance between a 
price and utility guarantee for the beneficiary pountry and the attraction 
which the possibility of making a large sale holds for tenderers. This 
system would apply essentially to agricultural projects'; which are carried 
out over several years. 
(d) It must be stressed that the practice of grouping into lots in particular 
enabled the disadvantages of the system of turnkey projects to be .~oided. 
Althoughthe latter system can, in certain specific cases, lead to perfectly 
coordinated projects finished on time, it has certain disadvantages as 
regards the general principles of development. In particular, it leaves 
no room for the educational effect expected of cooperatio~; it is also 
difficult to reconcile with the very principle of the invitation to tender, 
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for the all-in-job does not correspond exactly to the industrial structure 
of the member and associated countries; lastly, it would not ensure 
access on equal terms for all their nationals, and in particular it would 
exclude those industries in associated countries which do not possess the 
necessary capacity and staff to undertake all-in work:. 
However, under the system of grouping into homogeneous lots which are as 
large as is economically. and technically wrrant.ed, firms can submit tenders 
directly in accordance with their capacity - and firms of the associated 
countries are well oater.ed for under this procedUPe. 
1.5 Rules governing selection of·the contractor 
1.5.1 The arrangements cfor selecting the contractor for 1~ EDF contract 
following an invitation to tender are the subject of olose cooperation 
between the national authorities of the beneficiary assoCiated country and 
the Commission. 
(a) Normally the placing decision does not require a formal preselection 
procedure. 
1 A committee appointed for the purpose in accordance with national regulations 
is responsible for the opening of the tenders. However, as stipulated by 
the Commission Regulations laying down the operating rules for the second 
and third Funds respectively, the EDF Delegate is present as an observer 
at the opening of the tenders and also attends the subsequent meetings 
·' 
1
rn the preamble to the Decision implementing the General Specifications, 
the Counoil of Association atreaaed the advantage of the public openinc 
of tenders gradually becoming the rule for all categories of invitation 
to tender. It is already compulsory for supply contracts, but for works 
contracts it is still national regulations which determine whether the 
procedure is used. In practice, many of the Associated States now co~ply 
with this procedure. · 
I 
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at which the tenders are examined and proposals for the placing of the 
contract made. Thus, the Delegate acts as the guarantor of the regularitt 
of the proceedings at the different stages of the procedure. He approves 
the choice of contractor on behalf of the Commission - or refers to the 
latter in complex cases. 
(b) For major works requiring a certain financial and technical capacity 
,..., I\ " R 
on the part of the contractors, the Commission h~s recommended the use of 
a procedure whereby applications are sorted in advance: preselection. 
This operation comprises two stages: 
i~ preselection of candidates, decided by a national committee of the 
beneficiary countr,r, with the approval of the EDF departments; 
ii. an invitation to tender restricted to, preselected fipms. 
Both the Member States and the Associated States are familiar with this ' 
procedure, which is also used by large aid donors such as the World Bank. 
Thanks to this technique, firms are informed of the main details of the 
., 
project when they receive preselection notices; they are consequently in 
a position to acquaint themselves with a great deal of data concerning its 
execution, and to take advantage ot an appreciable period tor 1tu~ and 
reflection. This procedure also enables a prior assessment to be made of · 
the technical and financial means of fUture competitors, ~nd at the same 
time saves unsuccessful candidates unnecessar,r expenditur~ on the preparation 
of a tender. 
1.5.2 As regards selection criteria, the principle is tha~ of choosing the 
tender which is economically the most advantageous. 
This system implies that the lowest tender is not selected automatically. 
It involves taking into consideration, in addition to the amount of the. '' 
tender, other factors making for good management. 
I 
' 
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Article 20 of Council Regulation No 5 (first Fund), confirmed by Article 47(3) 
of the Financial Regulation relating to the second Fund, envisaged as 
assessment criteria the qualifications and guarantees offered by tenderers 
and the nature and conditions of execution of works and supplies. The 
Financial Regulation relating to the third Fund (Article 49(3)) added the 
concepts of the price, utilization cost and technical value of the services 
rendered. The latter are likewise listed in Article 45 of the General 
Specifications, which also mentions the financia~ guarantees. 
This set of criteria-· the list is not exhaustive1 -is intended to determine 
as far as possible the various components of a tender by weighing techni.cal 
considerations against financial aspects. 
The Commission sees to it that the special conditions spe~ify, wherever 
necessary, the elements to be taken into consideration inlthis respect. 
1.5.3 In accordance with the procedures set out above, and to enable the 
choice of contractor to be made on the basis of equality of terms, the 
Commission has laid down, in conjunction with the national departments of 
the Associated States, a number of rules to' facilitate the evaluation of 
tenders and to ensure maximum objectivity in comparing th~m. Account had 
to be taken here of the impact of such factors as the currency in which the 
contract is denominated, taxation and transport costs, and measures had to 
be taken to counter any discrimination here. The machineey established 
for this purpose has been partially embodied in Articles 31 to 37 of the 
General Specifications. 
·' 
1The parties negotiating the new association convention agreed to add the 
following criterion: "Where two tenders are acknowledg~ to be equivalent 
on the basis of the criteria stated above (the same as those stated in this 
paper), preference shall be given to the one which permi~a the greatest 
possible utilization of the physical and human resource~ of the AOP States." 
r 
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1.5.3.1 Currency of tender 
The effect of this factor varies according to the type of contract. 
(a) In so far as works contracts are concemed, the principles have been 
laid down taking into account the fact that the services t.o be prbVided · 
are tied to a clearly defined local area. 
It is for this reason that the tender is made out in the national currency. 
However, tenderers may indicate in their tenders the percentage of the 
amount of their tender which they wish to be paid in the currency of the 
Member State or the associated country of which they are nationals or in 
which they have their registered place of business. But grounds must be 
given for this transferable percentage so that the contractor cannot abuse 
the exchange rate guarantee 1 applying to this portion of the contract by 
inordinately inflating the foreign currency expenditure wliich he requires 
to be met. This being so, the Commission sees to it that the assessment of 
the percentage shown in the tender does notn enter into the evaluation of 
the tender itself. 
(b) In so far as supply contracts are concerned, account has to be taken 
of the complexity of the production and distribution proc•aa. Thus firms 
are free to express their tender either in the currency ot the countr,y in 
which they have their. registered place of bU.siness, or in' that of the 
·beneficiary country, 'or even in that of the Member State or Associated 
State in which the supplies are produced. Howevert in order to ensure 
I .~ 
1The exchange rate guarantee ia arrived at by fixing in the, contract for the 
full duration of. the execution of the works the rate of exchange ot the 
currency of the country where the contracting firm's registered place of 
of business is situated relative to the currency of the associated oount~ 
receiving aid from the EDF. See 1.7.2(c) below for the scope ot this 
mechanism. ' · · ' 
u s a st . u u wee&w . a;u 
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equality in the comparison oftenders, the price shown in currencies other 
than the national currency ia converted into the latter on the basis of 
the exchange rates published monthly in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities. The reference rates are those in force on the first working 
day of the month preceding the final date fixed for the submission of 
tenders. 
(c) The exchange rate guarantee accorded for part of the ~ount of the 
' . 
works contract and the fixing of exchange rates for the c~parison of 
tenders are characteristics peculiar to EDF contracts. The Commission 
sanctioned them after examining requests for their adoption from the 
relevant industrial sectors and being convinced that they were justified 
on practical grounds, which experience has moreover confirmed. 
The tenderers calculate the price of their tender appro:xima.tely one month 
before it is submitted, given the time required for drawing up the tender 
in its final form and for transmitting it to the destination, which generally 
takes a fairly long time. !: 
It is for this reason that the economic and monetary conditions existing at 
the time when the tenderers are oalculating,their price are decisive and 
taken into account and any change in the exchange rate ocoilrring subsequently 
no longer influences the assessment and comparison of tenders. ·Hence the 
care taken in the invitation to tender dossier to specifY the mechanism 
for determining the rate of exchange. " 
1.5.3.2 Taxation 
The arrangements concluded in this sphere with the associat~d countries have here 
again· resulted in there being a different a;istem dependin~' on the nature ot·· · · 
the contract. 
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(a) In so far as works contracts are concerned, in order that the amounts of the 
various tenders are directly comparable, the tenders submitted include all entry 
duties, taxes and levies to be paid in the associated country upon performance of 
the contract as set out in the "General Information Sheet" contained in the 
invitation to tender dossier. 
(b) In so far as supply contracts are concerned, the Commission has managed to 
arrange a compromise between the nol'JIIal practices of international trade and the 
need to protect the ~tional indu~tries of the assooi4ted developing countries. · 
This is why tenders are calculated net of entry duties and taxes when they .are 
concerned with manufactured goods or supplies origi~ting outside the beneficiary 
country. On the other hand, in order to neutrali~e the effect of indirect 
taxation when tenders are compared, those involving local manufactures or supplies 
are submitted without including the oons~tion or production tax (ex-works price). 
The fixing of rules governing taxation and the transparency of the latter are of 
. r. 
great importance in determining whether the terms are equal. The fixing of 
these rules enables the tenderers to calculate their tender with full knowledge 
of the facts; what is more, should the tax syste• change, the firms are still 
covered because of the price review mechanism. ,! 
In this field there has been a particular problem with regard to supp1y contracts 
if the place of delivery is not the same as the port of discharge. 
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In this case calculation of the cost of transport to the interior and in particular 
that of transport for which there is no official rates may raise serious diffioul ties 
for non-resident suppliers in that they do not have available sufficiently accurate 
information on costs. 
There have been occasions when various competitors have approached one or more 
transport firms holding a monopoly and have been quoted different prices; if the 
cost of transport to the interior is thus calculated differently according to the 
various tenderers and if, because of the distance .involved, transport represents 
a considerable part of the contract, equality of competition is no longer guaranteed. 
In order to eliminate this source of discrimination which might affect the conditions 
of competition, the invitation to tender dossier specifies the geographical location 
to which the cost of transport (and insurance) is included ~n the tender. . This 
' l ., 1. 
location, which must be si~uated on a network subject to official rates, is calfed 
the point for comparing tenders. The cost of transport from this point to the r 
place of delivery is not taken into account when tenders are compared. 
The principle underlying this system, which consists of exo~uding from the comparison 
of tenders any element in the contract which might ~e oalou+ated on an erroneo~s 
or false basis, is used for solving in the same fashion problems similar to that 
of transport • If' the supplier of a piece of complex industrial equipment, for 
example, is required to train personnel for a given period, p~nt for this 
service ~ vary according to the various allowances for board ~d lodging 
provided by the tenderer, allowances which cannot be calculated on the same bases. 
In such a case, the price submitted for the training is calculated independentl,7 
I 
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from the prices asked for the equipment and its installation. This enables the 
basis used for the calculation to be known, any errors made to be detected and 
thus makes it possible to exclude the cost of training from the comparison of 
the tenders or to include it after~it has been adjusted • 
1.6. Measures to ensure a·balanced sharing of work between firms established 
in the count;y concerned and foreign firms 
The special features of ce~ain operations fip.anced by the ~ have led the 
Commission to relax the arrangements for recourse to open international invitation 
to tender. 
Thus the Fund's Chief Authorizing Officer is empowered, according to the provisions 
of the Commission Regulations l~ing down the operating rules for the functioning 
of the second and third EDFs, to authorize, -. an exceptional measure, the plaotng 
of contracts after restricted invitation to tender, the oonQlusion of contracts by 
direct agreement (mutual agreement contracts) and the perfo~oe of contracts 
by public works department~. 
Derogations of this kind are provided for ce~ain operations connected with 
exceptional aid (in cases of economic diffio~tiea resulting from a fall in world 
prices or from natural disasters) and in oases of recognized emergency or where 
~ t 
the nature, the minor importance of the specific charaoteri~tios of certain works 
f. 
or supplies so justify. 
~ However, above all, with the entry into force of the third EDF, both the Yaound.e 
~ r. 
Convention itself and the Financial Regulation have given the official stamp to 
~ r, 
a certain number of special procedures which supplement or correct the above-~ ~ 
mentioned practices. 
These procedures are based on the idea that in certain oase~ the rules governing 
.~ 
participation should be such as to ensure a balance of tasks between local and 
r: 
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foreign firms in relation to their economic and technical resources. The purpose 
of some of these procedures is to encourage cooperation between firms; others 
provide arrangements in favour of industries in the associated countries. 
1.6.1. Under Article 49(2)(d) of the Financial Regulation relating to the third 
Fund the Commission is invited to encourage, in so far as possible, especially 
where large-scale works or works of a special technical nature are to be carried 
out, cooperation between firms of the Member States and of the~Associated States, 
Countries and Terriories, in particular by preselection and the creation of groups •. 
The Commission has already gained much experience in this field. 
(a) As has previously been stated, the practice of grouping services into 
homogeneous lots was partly conceived for this purpose (see above). 
J 
Moreover, the AASM/OCT firms are eligible to participate ~s sub-contractors 
to the foreign contractors and thus often obtain their own share of the large 
works contracts. 
~ 
(b) The Commission has also taken steps to encourage directly, collaboration 
' between firms through the setting up of multinational groups of firms. 
This action was the fruit of much discussion with the Union of the Industries of 
the European Community (UNICE). The latter, concerned by th~ fact that originall~ 
almost all the overseas works contracts were awarded to traditional firms - in 
other words mainly the locally established subsidiaries of firms that are nationals 
of the former colonial powers - had proposed that the Commission take action to 
ensure that contracts of a certain size were reserved sole~ fpr groups of firms 
I 
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oo~osed of partners of at least two different nationalities. 
The Commission refused, however, to adopt a measure whioh might jeopardize free 
competition and instead tried to persuade the relevant industrial circles to 
aooept its view by stressing the advantages that such collaboration would surely 
provide, such as the pooling of technology or the reduction of administrative 
costs. 
It was also in order to meet this objective of oooperation~hat the previously~ 
mentioned formula of preselection was advocated. ' Published in good time with 
maximum information on the administrative and technical conditions of the works 
to be carried out, it gives the various candidates approximately two months to 
find the ideal partner(s)'with the right equipment and technology to complete 
their own potential. 
From this point of view preselection was even made compulsory in the texts of the 
" third Fund for works contracts estimated at over 5 million u.a. 
The formula has produced encouraging results in that stable groups have gradually 
been formed, often composed of the locally established subsidiary of a European 
firm, a firm which is a national of the beneficiar,y country and a partner from 
outside which is a newcomer to the market. This procedure has enabled the local 
partner's technology and organization to be improved and the new arrival to be 
initiated into local conditions. 
r. 
Heartened by this encouraging experience, the Commission, looking ahead to the f'ourth 
EDF, proposes to oontinue .. enoour&.ging groups- whilst. recommending that. the oo:Qlj)ulsor;y 
·, 
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nature of preselection be dropped in so far as the latter has produced satisfactory 
results: groups have been established, a number of them have given proof of their 
ability and competence, their multinational composition is in line with what the 
Commiseion intended and these groups regularly reply to EDF invitations to tender. 
1.6.2 The second aspect of the corrective measures for the rules governing the 
open international invitation to tender is based on the concern to protect the 
economies of the associated countries. 
II • 
The legal basis for these exceptions is in the actual text of. the second Yaounde 
Convention, Article 26(2) of which stipulates that "the provisions of paragraph 1 
(the principle of participation on equal terms) shall be without prejudice to 
measures intended to assist construction or large or small-scale product~on 
undertakings of the Associated State concerned, or of another Associated State 
in the same area, to take part in the execution of public wo~ks contracts of 
limited scope or of contracts for the supply of locally produced goods". 
- '1 
Some of the measures which have been taken under this headin~ are concerned with~ 
works contracts, others with supply contracts;, it must moreover be emphasized 
that the new association looks as though it will tend to accentuate the preference 
given in this ~ to the firms of the Associated States. 
1.6.2.1 Works contracts 
Under the second Fund, faced with a certain lack of interest on the part of 
international tenderers.for small-scale works contracts, the Commission had deemed 
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it useful to use an invitation to tender procedure more appropriate to this type 
of contract which, without excluding participation by all the interested firma, 
would be directed more particularly at the firms of the neighbouring Associated 
States. Thus the practice of the local or regional invitation to tender was 
established. 
---........-
Th6 texts relating to the third Fund have made this practice official by providing 
the possibility of organizipg an accelerated »rooedure for ipsuing invitations tp 
tender, which includes shortened time-limits for the submission of tenders. 
Invitations to tender by accelerated procedure are published in abbreviated form· 
in Europe in ihe OfticialJournal of the European Communities and various journals 
which include this information. The time-limits for the submission of tenders 
are those usually applied for public contracts in the beneficiary country, subject 
I ) 
to a minimum period being observed. 
'· It should be emphasized that these provisions :are not designed to exclude 
participation by foreign firms. Participation by them is still possible since 
the invitations to tender are publicized although on a minimum scale. By 
encouraging this type of procedure, the Commission wished above all to increase 
the number of works contracts performed by the national firms of the associated 
r 
, I 
countries; but at the same time, given the small likelihood of foreign ·competition, 
it was able to aim at accelerating projects. 
I 
The limit below which such a procedure ~ be organized was fixed at 500 000 u.a. 
r; I 
under the third Fund and will increase to 2 million u.a. under the fourth Fund -
I· 
which is a more realistic assessment of the threshold above which foreign competition 
I 
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is likely. However, in order to maintain the advantages of certain patterns 
of specialization, the Commission considers it necessary to arrange for the 
traditional international invitation to tender to be possible where the nature 
of the work might in this respect favour the operation being oarried out under 
the best technical and financial conditions. 
1.6.2.2 Supply contracts 
' " The provisions adopted in this field are not con~erned with participation in 
competition but with the choice of the contractor. 
It should first of all be emphasized that Commission Regulation 229/72 formally 
excluded the accelerated procedure for supply contracts. The Commission realized 
that there is no threshold below which European industries would fail to be 
interested. Moreover, the formula invitation to tender w~th a simplified 
dossier (see. above) alone enables the imposing objective t6 be met of speeding 
up the operations thanks to the shorter time-limits for t~ submission of tenders. 
r 
On the other hand, in order to encourage the national industries' production it 
was decided to give those industries a "degree of protection", to be taken into 
account when tenders which are technically and economically equal are compared, 
The Financial Regulation for the third EDF reserved application of this degree 
of protection to newly created or developing industries which produce a sufficient 
margin of value added. The amount of protection, decided on a· case-by-case basis, 
' Dla\Y be as high as a margin of 15% compared with the tender considered the most 
economically advantageous. 
t 
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The Commission has had its recommendation accepted that the 15~ preference be 
applied automatically under the fourth EDF to all tenders for supplies originating 
in any of the associated countries. 
It has also had its proposal accepted that the price preference system be extended 
to works contracts. However, so as not to increase inordinately the cost of 
projects, the Commission considered that the degree of protection should be limited 
to a percentage lower than~hat suggested fo~ supply contraqts (1o%) and be app~ied 
exclusively to works contracts valued at less than·2 million u.a. 
Firms in the Associated States will thus be given a two-fold stimulus for small 
works contracts both from the point of view of participation (accelerated procedure) 
and from that of the placing of contracts (price preference). 
1.7 Rules for the performance of contracts to ensure indirectly that the terms are 
c L' equal 
The principles evoked above are all concerned directly with the procedures for 
preparing and placing contracts. 
., 
Other factors, conneoted with the rules for the performance~of contracts, also 
pl~ a part in determining how attractive contracts are to firms. This is 
particularly the case for the financing facilities granted to firms and for the 
limitation of excessive commercial obligation~ required of ~uppliers. These 
~ produce an unquestionable widening of the, field of competition particularly 
. : I. 
for small-scale and forC:Iign firms. Thus the Commission has taken care to remove 
I 
I 
I 
!! 
i' 
-
VIII/78/7'}-E 
the causes of discrimination and to give a certain amount of support and 
protection to those which have been awarded EDF contracts. 
1.7.1. A contractor who is performing a contract, especially a works contract, 
often commits considerable expenditure which ~ not be covered by adequate 
funds. This is a difficulty which especially faoes small firms whose financial 
standing is not very high and whose opportunities for obtaining bank loans are 
limited._ 
In order to get round this kind of obstacle, which might restrict participation 
in EDF contracts, the Commission has formulated measures to ease the financial 
situation of the firms, either by directly granting advanc~s, or making it easier 
for the firms concerned to obtain bank loans. 
' . (a) Advances ~ be granted to the contractor for operations preparatory to the 
performance of the contract. Subject to the establish~nt of a guarantee 
(deposit or directly liable guarantor), the contractor may obtain two kinds; 
of advances: 
i! a lump-sum advance enabling him to meet e:x:penditur• resulting from the;. 
start of the contract, which is p~able as soon as.notification is given 
that the contract has been accepted; 
, ii~ an advance for the purchase or order of plant, machines, tools and mat~rials 
necessary for the performance of the. contract and qf any other prior expenses 
of a major kind, such as the acquisition of patent~ and study costs. 
Reimbursement of the advances is made by means of a deduction from the instalments 
and possibly from the balance owing to the contractor in accordance with th~ 
procedure laid down in the Special Conditions. 
.. 
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It should moreover be emphasized that the lump-sum advance to cover expenditure 
resulting from the start of the contract is, because of its prefinanoing nature, 
not cleared until the performance of the contract is already well advanced. 
Such a mechanism is justified by the desire to make sure that the advance serves 
its purpose by allowing the contractor to make use of it for a sufficiently long 
period. 
" ~ (b) The second source which enables firms to obta~n adequate funds is recourse 
to bank loans. 
However, the opening of credit accorded in this w~ to contractors is genera111 
only granted where the credit institutions have been provided with guarantees. 
This is why the Commission has established a system of mechanisms to facilitate 
this set-off for oontraotots while ensuring ~hat both the c~ditors and the 
administration of the beneficiary associated 1country are given the essential 
legal security. 
~ 
Originally the only mechanism provided for was that of pledging the contract 
' . ~ 
as security, a mechanism well known in French law and in the regulation of the ' 
French-speaking Associated States. However, in order to ensure equal terms f9r 
firms accustomed to different laws and unfamiliar with this 1mechanism, the 
Commission subsequently provided for the possibility of using at the same time 
another more current procedure, that of the assignment of debt. 
Finally, as regards supply contraots in particular the Commission noticed that 
suppliers obtained bank loans more easily if the contracts ~hey held were clearly 
I 
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shown to be ftnanoed by the EDF. Thus a procedure for the authentication ot 
contracts was instituted: at the request of the supplier or his bank, a 
certificate is delivered by the Fund's Chief Authorizing Officer, certifyin~ 
that the contract is financed by the EDF. 
1.7.2 The Commission's action was not limited to measures for making it easier 
for firms to obtain funds. It paid particular attention to establishing the 
'EDF's reputation as a prompt payer by doing its utmost to e'nsure that plqlll8nts • 
due to firms for their services are made within a'particular1y short period of 
time. 
(a) Generally speaking, when delays occur in the issue of payment documents which 
might call into question the whole performance of the contract, the Chief 
Authorizing Officer is au~orized by Commission regulations to take ~ measure 
required to remedy such a situation. 
' ·j 
The Commission may even take the place of the national authorities in order to 
make directly the payments due to the contractor. 
t 
(b) As regards supply contracts, which here pose a speoia~ problem, the Commission 
' has attempted to reduce as far as possible for the contract holder the burden of 
interim financing. 
!' 
The measures taken to achieve this are of two types: 
1: 
i· Phasing of p~ents must be provided for in the Special Conditions. Here, 
in order to bring. the EDF's terms of p~ent closer t~ those in use in th• 
commercial sector, a.standar4 formula.was reoemmended. 
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It oonsiots of p~ing a certain percentage of the amoupt of the order at 
each important stage in the performance of the contra~t (notification of · 
the contract, loading of the goods, provisional acceptance of the latter) • 
so that there is only a balance of the order of 1o% to. be settled at the 
end of the guarantee period, after final acceptance of the supplies. 
In the past the first two instalments of the above bills-p~ble book have 
often been paid late! n .. 
On due reflection the Commission considered that in so far as these p~nts had 
to be made outside the beneficiary associated country without there even being 
any requirement to establish the reasons for this inside that country, it could 
as manager of the EDF funds, aot on its own account. The Commission therefore 
adopted the procedure of directly sanctioning and p~ing ~bese first two instal~n'• 
of the amount of the contract. 
(o) As regards p~nt for works contracts, ,the importance of the previouSly 
mentioned exchange guarantee mechanism rate will be remembered. 
The exchange rate guarantee protects the contractor against devaluation of the 
• e 
currency of the country where the works are carried out. Since this involves ,, 
that part of the contract for which the contractor has requested payment, at the 
time of his tender, in the currenoy of the country in whioh his registered pl~e 
of business is situated, the rate of exchange applied until the ·services have bee~ 
rendered in full remains that in force at the time when the tender was drawn up. 
This parity therefore has a contractual character. 
,tlfAC t&&H4 liMA!Q_&QW 
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The contractor is therefore safe in the knowledge that the amount of c~ency 
required, where appropriate, for paying the expatriate staff and importing plant 
or materials will retain its value compared with the local currency -whatever 
the fluctuations in the latter. 
1.7.3 The suppliers' commercial obligations are in line with the standards 
generally in force for public contracts. Suppliers are tn particular required 
to provide the usual commercial guarantees for a certain period of time varying n 
according to the nature of the supplies. 
Th~se obligations also imply the possibility of an after-sales service guaranteeing 
the maintenance and repair of the supplies as well as the resupply of spare and 
replacement parts. However, in this respect, th~ Commission has had to take 
the.necessary precautions to'ensure that exces~ive requiremen~s do not have the 
effect of excluding suppliers who are not established in the lssociated countries 
from the invitations to tender. Thus the Gene'ral Provisions ~of Part B of the 
invitations to tender with simplified dossier for supply contracts contain a 
particularly flexible device which provides for: 
i~ the possibility of waiving suoh an obli~ion if, because of their nature• 
the supplies do not require after-sales ~ervice; 
;ii. the possibility for the supplier to have after-sales service provided by 
an intermediary in respect of whom it is. sufficient to produce references. 
: 
~n conceiving and applying these various measures, the Commission has taken into 
account what it has learned from ex.perienoe and has introduced the measures as it 
haa found or aa it baa been broUiht to ita notioe ~hat ooaptti~ion haa been 
infringed. 
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There is no doubt that this pragmatism will remain the rule for supplementing, . 
where appropriate, the vi,tal system for ensuring tltat the principle of equal terDJB · ··· 
is observed. 
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2.1 Development of the rate and volume of invitations to tender 
2.1.1 General trends 
The table in Annex I shows the wa:y international invitations to tender 
for works and supply contracts financed by the EDF have developed from 
the outset in terms of number, volume and average amount involved. 
.... "' . "' "' If the difficult year following the launch ~f the first FUnd is discounted, 
a breakdown by five-year periods {196o-64, 1965-69, 197o-74) reveals certain 
general trends which crystallized as the three Funds progressively overlapped 
one another. 
In particular, it will be seen that: 
1 r 
i. during the first period, there was a rapid increase in the volume 
of contracts; a decisive step forward was made in the second 19ar 
(62 million u.a.), a peak was reached during th• fourth year 
(113 million u.a.), and at the end of the period the volume started 
to fall off; 
ii. during the second period, there was again a gradual increase in the~ 
., ~ 
first three years, the peak being reached in th~ third year 
(103 million u1a.); 
'\ 
iii. during the third period, after an appreciable decrease during the 
first year, there was a major recovery from the second year• 
reaching a peak in the third year (over 122 million u.a.). 
I 
The average value of contracts placed following invitations to tender 
has followed this general trend. It will be noted, however, that for 
the third period, the peak was reached ·in the second tear - 1971 - though 
1. 
I • 1 
I 
... "'· 
.: 
I 
I 
I. 
I 
,. 
I 
I· 
•• ' . 
1 
I 
Jo 
.. 56 .. VIII/78/7~ 
Vlii-1 
:fewel' invi tatiollis to tend~r were is$\led during that ~ar. 
It should be pointed out, moreover, that a new pattern elJlerged in the 
average value of contracts placed following invitatiops to t$Dder during 
,, 
the last five-year period: 
i. In general terms, the total number of invitations to tender is lesf;J fo71 
the period 1970-74 (376) than for'eaoh of the preceding f'ive.;year , 
periods ( 318 and 469 respectively). The a~rage varied between six md. · 
eight invitations to tender per month, depending on the perl.od i~ questiOJa' 
ii.However, the average value of oontraots placed following invdtations ~o 
tender was appreciably greater for the period 197o-74:. ' ·· 1 195 000 u.a. 
as against 952 000 u.a. for the period 1960 · a:nd 896 000 u.a. foJ' 
the peri (Xi 1965 -69, 
2.1.2 Analzsis 
The general t:rends outlined above are the res\41; ~f the interplq of vari.OP 
factors which 1 t is easier to clarify by means of a breakdown by type ot 
contract (see table in AQnex II). 
(a) The perio4 1960 -!4 ·: 
The steady increase in the overall volume o:f oontraots during this phase t 
involving only contracts under the first Elm', was due , to the inorease in ·.[wo~-. 
contracts. I 
' 
The pe$k reached in 1963 responded to a large inorea~e in the vqlume • but 
not in the number - of both works and 8\lpply contracts. ~This is 
I 
I r: 
I 
-~· - .... ·····:··- -
due to the speeding up of the procedure for financing decisions on 
major projects under the first FUnd. 
(b) The period 1965=1969 
· The first year was marked by something of a falloff following a ., 
'movement which had started at the end of' the preceding period; this . 
falloff - affecting both types of contract ~ corresponded to a slowin&-
. 
···down of operations under· the first Fund· at a time when the execution 
of projects under the sec~nd FUnd had on~ just started. 
·However, during the second phase (1966-1969) there was a reoover,r 
due to the fact that projects under the second Fu.nd had progressivelr 
become fUlly operational. 
It will be noted that supply contracts increased steadi~ in both 
number and :il -,glume-.'{'he cmrve is slightly different for works 
contracts, the volume of which decreased in the final year of the 
period; the high point for the award of contracts for major projects 
' 
was in 1967, and it is for this reason that the total volume of 
contracts reached a peak in that year. 
n 
.(c) The period 197Q-1974 
As in the preceding period, the appreciable reduction in the volume 
1 
of contracts for the first year is indicative of the transitional 
phase which that year constituted. 
This phase came before the start of projects under the third FUnd 
'I 
and at the same time was marked D1, a slowin& down of operations 
I 
under the second Fund as regards both works and aupplr oontraota. 
r r, 
'. 
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The following phase, however, saw the effective launch of contracts 
under the third Fund. 
This factor has had a marked impact on the pattern: of the statistics 
" M 
relating to works contracts. It explain~ the sharp up-swing from 
n 
1971 in the curve relating to invitations to tender for works contracts. 
It should be emphasized, moreover, that the steady increase in the 
resources committed under the third ED:Jr hides the accompanying 
reduction in contracts placed under the other two Funds. 
The figures for supply contracts reveal a slightly different movement. 
There was a sharper drop in the number and value of invitations to 
tender issued for such contracts in '1971. This mat be explained both 
by the quite natural slowing down of. operat-ions under the s.econd Fund 
and by del~s - solely attributable to the economic situation at the 
time - in the implementation of projects under the,, third Fund. 
,. 
However, the situation recovered in·the following year, and the increali:se 
in the number and value of supply contracts - mainly due to the contract& 
placed under the 'third EDF- explains the peak rea'Ched in 1972 by the 
total value of contracts placed following invitatibns to tender. The 
rationalization measures described in Chapter I, item 1.4, have come to 
full fruition here. 
The figures for 1973 show the same trend as that fOr works contracts• 
namely the combination ·;·,of a marked slowdown in operations under. the 
first and second Funds and normal growth under the third Fund. 
The data for 1974 produce a profile similar to th&t for. 1969: an,in~re•se 
in respect of supply contracts ,with an average, nwer previousq reached, 
t 
I rl 
... 59-
of 475 000 u.a. 1, and a sharp downturn for works contracts sub~equent 
to the slowdown in operations under the third EDr. 
Thus, a new transitional phase seems to have started. There can be 
no doubt, however, that the substantial fourth EDF will enable peaks 
to be reached in the future which were never approached under the· earlier 
Funds. 
(d) Lastly, it should be pointed out that in view of the trend of the 
average value of contracts placed following invitations to tender, 
a distinction should be made in respect·of invitations to tender 
issued since 1971. 
r, 
Here account must be taken of the measures put into effeot under 
the second Yaounde Convention. 
1 
Because of the facilities granted for the issue ot invitations to 
r ,. 
tender b,y accelerated procedure and for the conclusion of mutual 
agreement contracts, the curve for traditional international 
invitations to tender has turned downwards. 
Accordingly, it Will be noted that between·1 Janu8.r,r 1971 and 
31 December 1974, 55 iDYitations to tender for works contracts worth 
18 580 000 u.a. were issued by acceaerated procedUre, whereas 116 
invitations to tender worth 337 144 000 u.a. were still issu'd bf 
the traditional procedure. 
1 This is mainly accounted for by the amounts relating to four 
invitations to tender for the supply of rail~~equipment, the 
equipping of a tea factor, and a large order tor fertilizers 
and insecticide. ~ 
'I 
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According~, compared with the figures for the preceding years, 
the average value of contracts placed following traditional 
international invitations to tender in the years 1971-74 is still 
considerably higher.· In 1971 it was over 2.5 million u.a. and 
in 1972 and 1973 it even went beyond the 3 million u.a. mark,but 
dropped to slightly over 2 millio~ u.a. in 1974. However, 
between 1959 and 1970 the average for invitations to tender for 
works contracts exceeded 2 million u.a. only once (in 1967).1 
2.2 Results of invitations to tender 
The table in Annex III contains ~ breakdown by nationality .of works 
and supp~ contracts placed under the three FUnds, showing the 
position at 31 December 1974• 
It enables certain interesting comparisons to be made, though it 
r- ~ , 
must be borne in mind that the three Funds are not at the same 
1_ r· 
stage of develppment since they w~re launched at different times. 
.. 
Thus, the accoUnts for the first EDF are now cl~sed, with contracts~ 
'1 
totalling 442 million u.a. Similar~, the con~racts which have so far 
been placed under the second EDF amount to a similar sum - 412 million, •• , 
On the other hand, the third EDF, with a ~rent 
total of the order of 283 million u.a., ~as not yet reached a comparable 
level; also, the overall balance of contracts Under the third EDF 
has not yet taken final shape. ·I 
2 .2.1 If the figures 'for all contracts are considered, it can be 
seen that the general stru.cture of distribution varies according to 
the Fund - though there is a more pronounced gap between the first 
r 
1 ~e averase value shown in the table for work~ oontraots does not 
correspond to these figures, ror it includes .invitation& to tender 
issued by accelerated procedure. Taking traditional international 
invitations to tender in isolation, their average value was 
3 073 000 in 1972, 3 683 000 in 1973 and 2 o83 000 in 1974• 
., 
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EDF on the one hand and the second and third EDFs on the other. 
(a) The results of the first EDF show a fairly marked imbalance, 
which is evidenced by the following: 
i. · two dominant items - well above .the 25~ threshold - for ll'rench 
firms and firms of the AAf!JA./ccT group; 
ii. a share of the order of 15~ for Italian firms alone; 
I 
iii. as regards the four other Kember States, a share of 5~ for 
Gel'lll8J.I1' and less than 5~ for the Benelux countries. 
(b) The results or the second EDF sh~ an appreciably' more bal&Doed 
structure. 
L 
Although the French share remains virtually the same, there is 
a rebalancing in the 1o-2o% brack~t, with the AASMjocT, 0el'DI8l'O' 
and Italy' all coming within it. 
Benelux firms are still in the lower bracket, although Belgium's 
share is above 5~· 
II 
(c) The results available so far for .the third EDF if,.ndioate a 
structure occumng something of an intermediate poli tion betwe•n 
those which emerged for contracts under the other two PUndsl 
" . 
this situation is particularly marked in the oa~e, or Gel'JII&ZlT' 
Belgium, Italy' and the AASIJ/OCT. 
' I 
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2.2.2, On the basis of the same comparison for all contracts, 
certain main trends m~ be traced, through the t;hree Funds by 
reference to the nationality of the cnntractors. 
(a) It will be noticed first of all that France, with a relatively 
stable shar.e of around 45%, is in a partioul,arly dominant 
position. This dominance would seem to be increasing, judging . 
by the present situation of the third EDF. 
(b) The Luxembourg share is the only one which has increased 
I 
continuously; under the third EDF it even crossed the 1% 
threshold. 
(c) The situation for German;, Belgian, Italian, butch and AASM/OOT 
contractors moved in a similar manner, althdUgh in opposite 
directions: 
- After a somewhat poor start under the first EDF, German and 
Belgian firms were much mor.e successful ~der the second EDF. ,~ 
But whereas Belgian firms have maintained their im~roved 
position under'the third EDF despite a slight downturn, 
German firms have lost considerable ground. Dutch contractors 
increased slightly under t~e second EDF a~ compared with 
the first, but their number has likewise ~een reduced 
considerably under the third EDF. 
- There has been some instability in the performance of Italian 
I 
and AASM/OOT firms too, but here the pattern is reversed: a 
tl 
decline-lmder.the--.aecoDd·EDF to11owed 'by a significant 
reoove:r;r under the third EDF. 
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2.2.3 An examination of this overall data according to t,r.pe of 
contract shows that on the whole the results set out above depend 
greatlJ on those achieved for works contracts. 
Works contracts account for 89% of the contracts placed under the 
first FUnd and 79% of those placed under the second and third FUnds. 
" ' " 
The simila.ri ty between the figures is thus pa.rtiaula.rq marked for 
the first FUnd, as it ia for the other two FUnds • though to a lesser 
degree. 
There is, however, a s+isbt difference in the choice of criteria for 
assessing the economic repercussions of the two types of contract& 
the works contracts breakdown takes account of th~nationalit,y of 
the contractors, whereas for the purposes of the ~ppq contracts 
breakdown the results have been worked out on the basis of the origin 
of the goods. This difference is due to the fact that the 
nationality of the suppliers is not~ a pa.rtiaularli accurate indicator 
of direct participation b7 European: firms, since nea.rlJ all the 
supplies are distributed b,y wholesalers established in the associated 
countries. 
I 
Given the foregoing considerations, it is necessar,r to see what 
factors have contributed to such a breakdown in respect of the two 
types of contract. 
., 
As regards works contracts, the analysis will involve a stu~ of 
,. . 
participation levels b,y establishing the relationShip between the 
number of tenders submitted b.1 a countr,r and the number of contracts 
placed with that countr,r. However, in order to ensure thoroughness 
the examination will be limited to contracts under the third EDF, 
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the breakdown for which occupies something of an intermediate 
position between those for the other two FUnds • 
2.3 Breakdown of works contracts - analysis of contracts placed 
and participation levels kthird EDF) 
' 
The table showing the breakdown of works contracts as at 31 December 1974 
(see Annex No III) gives a total of 223 636 000 u.a.lfor contracts 
under the third EDF. 
In fact, the value of the contracts placed following invitation 
to tender under the third EDF alone is 186 817 000 u.a., for it 
is necessar,y to deduct from the overall total the appropriations 
charged to the third EDF but earmarked as addJ-tional financing 
for projects in respect of which contracts wer~ awarded under the 
first two Funds - 25 205 000 u.a. - and the value of the contracts 
placed without international invitation to tender - 11 614 000 u.a. 
It is on the basis of this real figure of 186 817 000 u.a. that 
the analYsis of the contracts has been carried out. 
In order to determine more closelY the impact of the 
various factors which have contributed to the ~reakdown described 
above, the size of the contracts should be taken into consideration 
first of- all. 
Factors such as the minimum value attracting f.preign firms or the 
degree of complexity of the projects have an effe.ct on where 
contracts are placed. 
Also, the sum of 186 817 000 u.a~ should not be considered as a· 
homogeneous ~ount but should be broken down into its main 
components b,y reference to the size of the contracts which make 
up its total. 
' I 
,·t 
''J, 
. ,, -
This overall sum has accordingl7 been divided into three sections 
on the basis of two ben~ks: 
i. 1 million u.a.: this is approximatel7 the minimum value attracting 
foreign firms; 
ii.3 million u.a.: the minimum for majorlnfrastructure projects 
{ports, major roadworks, etc.). 
On this basis, the volume of the works· .contracts placed under the 
third EDF can be broken down as follows: 
Contracts Volume :l tJ, ' (amount) ( 1000 u.a.) 
0 to 1 million u.a. 22 112 '· 11.84 
1 to 3 million u.a. 51 060 27.33 
> 3 million u.a. 113 645 60.83 
' 
Total 186 817 100 
:1 
It will be noted that the volume of contracts worth over 3 millionu.a. 
accounts for b.1 far the greatest portion of the total. ~ere 
is, moreover, a relationship between this situation and the average 
value of contracts placed following invitations to tender issued 
for works since the inception of the third EDF ( s.ee above). It will 
also be noted that more than 88~ b,y value of the contracts are in 
excess of 1 million u.a. 
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2.3.2 On these bases, the 91 invitations to tender issued since 
the start of the third EDF have been analysed and the results broken 
down according to the size of the resulting contracts. Here account 
has been taken of separate contracts - in particular for separate 
lots where works or supplies are subdivided into a number of lots. 
"" ,.. M r'l 
The analysis has covered a total of 122 contracts, involving 
their itemization by number and by value,.', and tlie Commission's 
departments have moreover examined the relevant tenders. 
This analysis has enabled the table in Annex IV to be drawn up. 
2.3.2.1 As regards contracts placed with single firms or with 
firms forming part of one-count:cy, consortia, four items are of 
particular interest: 
(a) Firms of the AASlJ/OCT group are almost in a ~ajori ty- position 
as regards contracts worth less than 1 mill~·on u.a.: their 
share represents 52% in value- and 7~ in numl:>er. 
r: 
~is reflects the ~tude of contracts placed b.1 accelerated 
procedure, of which almost all have been placed with AASM/OCT 
firms •. This position is made even stronger if the volume of 
contracts placed without international invitations to tender 
(approximately- 11.5 million u.a.) - as referred to above - is 
added to the volume of contracts placed wit~ firms of this 
group. 
AASM/OCT firms do not have so great a share of contracts 
worth between 1 and 3 million u.a.: 2o% in ~alue and 26% in 
number. This is due to the fact that contracts in this 
catego:cy placed with the firms in question ~e mostly worth 
. '· less than 2 million u.a.: they mainly-·involve hydraulio. 
engineering works, small-scale construction 'and 
hydroagricul tural schemes. 11 
' 
n 
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As regards contracts worth more than 3 million u.a., AASM/OOT firma 
have a relative~ small share (one contract representing 3~ of the 
value of the contracts in this categor,y). Nevertheless, this 
shows that the firms are capable of carrying out large-scale projects 
in areas where they.have alrea~ acquired a certain amount of 
experience (in this particular case, a eydroagrioa.ltural •ch•e). 
(b) The situation for French firms is somewhat the r~verse: 
i. As regards contracts worth less than 1 million u.a. they have won 
3CJ!o in value but only 17~ in number. This means t:q.at they have 
competed successfully mainly for contracts worth between 500 ·ooo u.a. 
and 1 million u.a., that is to s~ small contract~ for which open 
international invitations to tender were issued in view of the 
relatively complex services required (construction! of filtering 
or pumping stations for example). 
;i.i. For contracts worth between 1 and 3 million u.a., .French firms have 
n 
a bigger share: 4CJ!o in both value ~ number. Un,;J.ike the trend 
observed for AASM/OOT firms, a number of these contracts are worth 
more than 2 million u.a.: they involve medium-seal~ infrastructure . 
works (roads, -bri,dges) or specialized assembly wark (sanitary 
equipment). 
n 
iii .As regards contracts worth more than 3 million u.a~, the share of · 
r, 
contracts placed with French firms r_emains relatively high: nearly 
35% in value and 4~ in number; four of the eight contracts placed 
in this categor,y are in the 3 to 4 million u.a. br~cket: three 
involve roads and one a port project. Another contract - for a 
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hydroasrioaltaral· scheme- is worth slightlY more than 4 million u.a., 
and two others, worth between 6 and 7 million u.a., and for major 
road works. The French firms' outstanding success was the winning 
of a contract worth more than-8 million u.a. for a railw~ project. 
(c) Italian firms have been successfUl on•both sides of ~he two 
contract magnitude thresholds: 
i. They have won 8% in value and 6% in number of contracts worth less 
than 1 million u.a. The four contracts· they won in this category 
followed open invitations to tender. In this respect the situation 
is therefore comparable to that of French firms, although the Italian 
share is appreciablY less. 
ii. Italian firms have also won two contracts for a road ~ a port 
project, worth 7 million and 6.5 millio~ u.a. respectively. This 
represents approximately' 12~ in bo'h value and number of contracts 
worth more than 3 million u.a. 
On the other hand, Italian firms have won no contracts in the 1 to 3 
million·u.a. bracket. 
I (d) The performance of German firms' resuJ,.ts is similar to that of 
,I 
Italian firms. However, the volume of ~he contracts they have won 
11 
ia considerably less& 
i. One contract worth 301 000 u.a.: this was for the "work_s" part of 
a composite contract comprising a large !-proportion of ,upplies 
placed with the same contractor for the -extension of a~tea factory. 
ii~e contract worth 3 586 000 u.a. for the extension ofr.a port project. 
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It will be noted that Benelux firms have won no individual contracts. Their 
share comes from contracts placed with multinationals. 
2.3.2.2 As regards contracts placed with multinationals, two trends should be 
highlighted. These are evident from the table in Annex V, which details the 
overall figures given for multinationals in the preceding table. 
(a) If the value of the contracts placed is considered in terms of the three 
contract value sections, the following,observations m~ be mades 
i •. As regards contracts worth less than 1 million u.a. it will be 
observed that the performance of multinational is fairly mediocre 
(9% in value, approximately ~ in number) but their presence can 
be felt nonetheless. This presence can in fact be explained by 1 
• I the nature of the contracts.- works connected with ma~or supp~ contJaow, 
, I (like the contract placed with Germa;rzy" referred to above). f 
I· I 
'ii. As regards contracts worth between 1 and 3 million u.a. it will be I 
noted that the contracts placed with these firms are equivalent in 
I· 
value to those placed with French firma although .slightly fewer in ~ 
number. The analysis shows that a greater proportion of these 
contracts were in fact worth more than 2 million u,a. 
r. 
iii· As regards contracts worth more than 3 million u.a. there is a 
:1 
marked predominance of mul tinationalss . al thougQ. their share of 
I. 
the number of contracts placed is less than that. of the French 
(29% against 41%), the value of the contracts p~aced with them is 
much greater, since it represents. almost half' (4'7%) of the value 
1 ~- .... 
of the contracts in this oategor,y (it will be remembered that 
• I· 
the French share is 3,5%). The table detailing the contracts 
placed with multinationals shows that these are·in fact ver,r big 
I 
I 
I 
ii 
1 
I. 
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and all relate to road projeots: three of them are worth over 
10 million u.a. (and even 20 million u.a. for a French/German/AASM 
Consortium). 
It is also worthy of note that consortia have the greatest share of 
all contracts worth more than '1 million u.a., with an overal total of 
73 233 000 u.a.; their share accounts. for 45%- i.e., almost half- of 
the total value of these contracts (164-705 000 u.a.). 
This evaluation may be compared with an identical analysis carried out 
six years ago of invitations to tender issued between 1 January 1966 and. 
1 October 1968 - the period which saw the development of major 
projects under the second Fund: contracts placed with multinationals 
during that period accounted for an overall total of 97 889 000 u.a., 
representing 47% of all contracts worth· more than 1 m:i1lli.on u.a. 
(122 586 000 u.a.). The comparison shows clearly that the success of 
multinationals has not diminished under the third Fund and that the 
incentive measures taken by the Commission have borne ~!fruit. 
(b) This conclusion is borne out, moreover, by a.n examination of the 
composition of the consortia which have won contracts. 
The relatively large number of contracts placed with oonsortia composed 
of members from two different countries will be noted: 18 contracts 
out of 21 placed with multinationals. ' The wa;~ in which the contracts 
have been allocated reveals oertain constants; four contracts have been 
placed with Frenoh/AASM/OOT consortia, :three with Fraboo-Oerman oonaortia, 
three with Franco-Belgian consortia and three with Fr~oo-Italian 
consortia. 
" 
The other two-country consortia have each won a single contract, in some 
instances involving a large amount (as in the case of e. Belgo-Italian 
I ., 
' 
1 
'· ,.
" 
~-.......... .....----.. -- ------- .... ---.. ---··- .... ·--...... ·- ··--·· ..... '•',: 
·---·····---
I 
I 
I' 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
t 
I 
f 
!· 
I 
I 
• 71 • 
VIII/78/75-E 
V;i;i;J;a1 
consortium where the contract involved represents on its own almost 
4% of the present total for works contracts under the third EDF). 
Consortia whose'composition is more complex have won fewer contracts 
(3 out of 21) but for much higher sums (56% of the total value of oontraots 
placed with consortia). Thus, two consortia composed of three partners 
(one French/German/ AASM and the other ·Belgian/Italian/ AASM) won contracts 
. . 
worth a cumulative total of 31 564 000 u.a., in other words 1'7% of the 
total amount of works contracts under the third Fund. Similarly, a 
contract worth 10 185 000 u.a. was awarded to a consortium composed of 
partners from four different countries (Franoe/Germany/Belgi.um/AASM). 
It is also interesting to note that the contract-winning consortia composed 
of more than two partners each comprise an AASM firm:as well as European 
partners. This shows how far multinationals promote cooperation b~tween 
firms, with each of the firms concerned finding its place according to its 
scale. 
2.3.3 An examination of participation levels reveals certain trends. 
As has repeatedly been emphasized above, the number of contracts placed 
is not in itself indicative of the performance of firms: ·it should be 
weighted by the .value of the contracts. Nevertheless, this indicator 
remains of major importance for the statistical results when it is compared 
with the number of tenders. 
The tables analysing the performance of firms enable these two indicators 
to be compared. 
I 
I 
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2.3.3.1 In the case of single firms or firms forming part of one-oountr,y 
consortia, the different contract value brackets show that there is a 
certain relationship between the number.of tenders and the number of 
contracts p~aced. 
This should not be regarded as a sort of "award coefficient" for assessing 
the number of tenders required for a given nationalitf to win a contract. • 
Although certain constants can be discer.ned1; any trends revealed by this 
• factor should in actual fact be weighted by other factors such as the 
amount of the tenders or the geographical or monetary area where the 
contract is to be performed. 
On the other hand, it is interesting to note that a large number of 
contracts placed wi ~h a given country corresponds to a large number of r 
tenders submitted by that country. The performance of French and AASM/OCT 
firma illustrates this. · 
2.3.3.2. In the case of multinationals, this trend is less evident in 
the detailed analysis (table in Annex V) than in the overall share for 
cons~rtia (table in Annex IV): this is· illustrated by the performance 
of multinationals in respect of contracts worth over 3 million u.a.t whioh 
is comparable to that of French firms. 
. 
However, the detailed analysis of .the multinationals' performance, which is 
greatly conditioned by their diversity, suggests an opposite trend 
through the figures relating to the performance of consortia comprising 
more than two partners. No contract worth less than·. 3 million u. a. has 
been plaoed, with only one tender being submitted by mui tinationals; on C 
,, 
~ 
~A ratio of 1 : 5 for French firms can be seen•in each contract braoket t 
and a ratio of 1 z 3 for the AASM/OCT, firms in the fd.rst two contract 
brackets. 
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the other hand, nine tenders for contracts worth more than 3 million u. a. 
have led to three contracts. 
What emerges from all these considerations is not determinism but a sort 
of postulate reflecting a statistical tendency: logically enough, it 
is the firms that submit the most tenders that win the most contracts. 
" 
2.4 Breakdown of supply contragts: 
2.4.1 The table in Annex III gives the results for supply contracts under 
the three Funds. 
An examination of the breakdown by Fund shows that so far the best balance 
has been achieved under the second EDF, at least as: regards supplies 
originating in the Member States. 
The pattern of results through the three Funds va.ri .• s according to 1 
country: 
ii. 
iii. 
~ 
Supplies originating in France and Luxembourg nave increased oontinu:_ 
ously; 
Supplies originating in Germany a.nd the Netherlands, however, havec 
fallen off progressively, with a fairly sharp reduction from the 
second to the third EDF, particularly for Gel'lllBJ1Y; 
' ., 
Supplies originating in Belgium, Italy and the AASM/OCY'f have followed 
I , . , 
a.n irregular pattern: an increase from the first to the second Fund, 
·' followed by a drop under the third Fund for Belgium and Italy, while 
there has been a reverse trend for the AASM/OOT {with a strong 
r: 
recovery under the third Fund). 
I 
I 
'I " . 1 
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.1 
lllllltiii'!SPII!IIM~i""'G_.,,'IIII't¢111'!4_...,.... _,.,..,,,..,~, .:_,.,..,--,,a.,..,,, ... ,..,,,.,.s;......,; -.!!,.4•-•!'"'. ~----··--•. -~-----j---~~-~-..,.,.-..,.....,.,.......,-..~-ii-~-___,.......-
... 
- 74-
U~J.{fOf f)'-.lll· 
V.;r;;r;-1 
iv. Supplies originating in third countries have increased dramatically 
under the third Fund - from less than 1% to over 5%• This excep-
tional movement is attributable to the fitting out of a Zairian 
tea factory with specialized equipment originating in India. 
Here again account should of course be taken, when comparing figures, 
of the fact that the total sum made available from the third EDF for 
. 
contracts - approximately 60 million u.a. - is only 7o% of the total 
outl~ under the second EDF. The final breakdown which will emerge 
when operations under the third FUnd are closed cannot be predetermined 
on the basis of this sum and available for contracts, which is relatively 
low compared with the amount of all the contracts to be placed. 
Experience shows, moreover, that a single contract Of above-average val~e 
can modify the percentage breakdown. Products ori~nating in Luxembourg 
are a case in point: the equipping of a large oil mill with these 
products has led to a large increase in the Luxembourg share compared 
with its share under the first and second EDFs. 
2.4.2 A number of economic data should be considered in interpreting 
these various results. 
(a) It should ~irst of all be pointed out that the economic impact of 
supply contracts is assessed by reference to the origin of the good~ 1 · 
· for the complex organization of the distribution network for European 
manufactures is such that a large part of the consumer goods manu-
factured in Europe is in fact distriubted by wh~lesalers who have ~ 
• I 
r 
n 
r 
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i: 
I 
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their registered office in the associated countries. The comparitive 
: , tabld below illustrates this particularly clearlya 
BREAKDOWN OF SUPPLY CONTRACTS (for the third EDF) 
M 
" 
,. 
~ 
By origin of goods By. nationality of suppliers 
.Amount Amount Number of 
{'000 u.a.) fo {'000 u.a.) fe contractors 
2 643 4·39 2 758 4·58 5 
26 586 44·14 18 042 29·95 82 
5 807 9·64 : 7250 K 12.04 19 i 
4 693 1·19 3 211 ) 5·:B 10 
WXEMBOURG 1 929 3.20 1 750 2.91 1 
NETHI5RLANDS 2 521 4·19 1 734 2.88 5 
AASl'/001' 12 652 21.00 25 493 42.31 230 
THIRD COUNTRIES 3 407 5·65 - - -
TorAL 
,. 
" 
ft 
i 
60 238 100 60 238 
" 
100 352 .. 
It will be noted that the AASM/OCT share in the br..eakdown by nationality 
of suppliers is much bigger than in the breakdown by origin of supplies 
(+ 21'{o) and that it aocounts for virtually all the negative difference 
for all the other countries combined- in particular France (- 14'fo), 
Italy (- .2.5'{o) and the Netherlands (- 1.5%). This result is corrobob&-
·' 
ted, moreover, by the large number of AASM/OCT contractors - 230 - whioh 
is alnos:t' three times the number of French suppliers and 12 times the 
number of German suppliers. 
t 
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It is interesting however, to note that the German, Belgian and 
I 
Luxembourg shares var,y only slightly from one column to the other. 
This is because they have mainly been involved in the provision of 
special equipment such as hospital installations, slaughterhouses, 
miorc-wave links, medium and high voltage power lines, equipment for 
oil mills. These supplies require special allied services (in particular 
assembly) : aiso, European contractor~ have obtained contracts for~ 
which they tendered directly. Moreover, the Ge~an surplus is explained 
by the part plS\Yed by that country in the SUPP}Y and assembly of the 
equipment of Indian origin for the tea factory referred to above. 
(b) ~e two apparently aberrant trends noticeable in the third EDF 
figures, that is to SS\Y the large increase in the French share 
and the a~preciable decrease· in the German' share, are mainly due 
to two reasons : 
i. One is structural, and derives from the volume of traditional 
trade flows. A study of the results by are& shows that the c 
lion 1 s share by value of supply contracts goes to the francs 
area, where goods originating in France are better known and 
appreciated. This tendency to prefer goods: from the former colonial 
powers is likewise evident in the other a~as : ·for example 
Somalia, where a large percentage of supplies comes from Italy, 
or the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam, where deliveries have 
consisted almost entirely of products originating in the 
Netherlands ; 
ii. The other is economic, and derives from th~ ·ract that consumer 
goods originating in certain European countries have been 
considered by the tranditional tenderers &. having become less 
competitive. 
-·-. ··- .. ~ ....... . 
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This is largely explained by the monetary changes which have occurred 
on several occasions during the life of the third Fund. A particular 
case in point is Germany, whose supplies, given the successive revalua-
tions of the DM, have become progressively less competitive than French 
supplies, in respect of which export prices have been favourably affected 
by devaluation and the downward float. 
T,pe EDF procedures cannot therefore be blamed for the sometimes indiffer-· 
ent performance of certain countries. On the contrary, the action taken 
by the Commission has often had a positive influence in improving supplies 
to the beneficiary countries and in achieving a better sharing of the wor.K 
load. This is reflected by: 
i. The diversification of tenders from European firbs: the balance 
achi'eved under the second EDF is particularly indicative of this; 
ii. Cooperation between firms, in that many European. manufacturers have 
commercial links with distributer~ whose registe~ed offices are ~ 
located in the associated countries. SuCh a method of work sharing 
means that the economic spin-off from supply contracts benefi 1B both" 
European manufacturers and the beneficiary countries. It should b~ 
added that this 9,2, facto complementarity of services is not inoom- r. 
patible with the efforts made by the Commission to encourage direct a 
tendering by European firms and the development of home production ih 
the associated countries: the combination of these various factors 
should lead, in the longer term, to an appreciable expansion of 
competition. 
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Service contracts financed by the European Development Fund are concluded 
in the form of technical cooperation contracts. They comprise: 1 , 
i. studies for the preparation of projects, in particular from the 
angle of profitability, integration into the beneficiary country's 
economy, etc.; 
ii. works supervision, which involves providing the person on behalf of 
whom the work is to be oarried out with assistance in site management; 
iii. technical assistance, which involves making available to the national 
authorities staff to advise and assist the latter in the management 
of projects and, more generally, even in the oondudof their admini-
stra.tive duties. 
The special nature of these various services, which.essentially involve 
qua.li tati ve criteria, means that they:' cannot be cove"ired by invitation to 
1 tender procedures • The contra.ctorsi.in question~ selected in a 
different manner: they a.re designated by agreement between the bene-
ficiary countries and the Commission. The latter has th~ right to make 
proposals to the national authorities; Experience has shown, moreover, 
that so far this method of collaboration has generallly operated harmon-·· 
iously. 
Such a. system is useful for the statistical breakdown of ·contracts, in , 
~hat the Commission thus has an instrument enabling i~ to direct assignments 
·I 
1Under the fourth EDF, however, certain oontra.ots ma.r be awarded followin& 
invitation to tender where technical, economic or financial considerations 
warrant recourse to this procedure, particularly i~ respect of major 
studies which are highly complex and' technical. 
.... ~---·· 
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to consul tanoy firms and consultant engineers according to their 
nationality. This is a.ll the more important in that the volume of 
contracts for technical cooperation is equal in value to the expenditUre . 
on supply contracts - as m~ be seen from the table below. The figures 
given a.lso include expenditure incurred by EDF staff working on the spot 
(delegate and administrative and technical staff). 
BREAKDO\iN OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION CONTRACTS 
Position a.t 31 December 1974 
' 
Country 1st EDF 2nd EDF 3rdEDF 
, Amount % Amount % [' Amount % 
'r-
BELGIUM 6 449 13.85 9 912 9·79 8 025 12.89 E 
FRANCE 11 442 24.58 29 239 28.87 . 20 425 32.80 't 
GERMANY 9 242 19.65 26 054 25.73 15 332 24.62 
ITALY 9 797 21.04 ~4 184 14e01 n 10 226 16.42 " 
LUXEMBOURG 653 1.40 1 561 1-54 ·~ 1 307 2.10 
NETHERLANDS 5 123 11.01 9 774 9·65 5 .158 8.29 
AASM/OOT 3 849 8.27 10 548 10.41 1 792 2.88 
THIRD COUNTRIES 
- - - - - -
n n 
TOTAL 46 555 100 101 272 100 62 265 100 
M 
(Reminder): " , 
Supply contracts 47 699 85 414 
,, 60 238 ~ 
2. 5.1 An examination of these figures reveals the rebalancing that the · 
Commission ha.s been able· to effect through its powers in this field .• , " 
In particular, the German, Belgian and Dutch shares follow a. rising 
curve compared with that for works a.nd supply contracts, whereas the 
I 
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French share, while remaining the greatest, is somewhat reduoed. 
As regards the second a.nd third Funds, the balance thus achieved is 
particularly significant if it is compared with the Member States' 
percentage contributions to the financing of EDF operations, as is shown 
in the table below: 
COUNTRY· 2nd EDF 3rd EDF 
% % % % 
contributions oontraots contributions oontraots 
IELGIUM 9·45 9·79 8!89 12.89 
FRANCE ~3·77 28.87 33.16 32.80 
GERMANY 33·77 25·73 3$.16 24.62 
ITALY 13.70 14.01 15.62 16.42 
LUXEMBOURG 0.27 1·54 0:.28 2.10 ~ 
NETHERLANDS 9·04 9·65 8.89 8.29 
,, 
0 
AM3MjOCT 
-
10.41 ~ 2.88 
" 
Only the percentage of tecbnioal cooperation oontraots placed with the 
AASM/OCJr under the third Fund is greatly reduced. Of course, the higher 
percentages under the first and second Funds derived in the main from a 
speoial situation, namely the supervision of works ,oarried out under "!!he 
I 
J 
11 
.... 
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major oil palm projects financed in Ivory Coast1• Nevertheless, it can 
be seen that under the third EDF the AASM has had a very small share in 
the provision of technical cooperation services. 
It is for this reason that the situation will change profoundly under 
the fourth EDF. The negotiations on the enlargement of the Association 
have confirmed the practical proposals made by the Commission for much 
~ ~ . 
greater participation by the beneficiary countries; in partic~ar, 
. 
these involve material support for national administrations that have . 
staff capable of carrying out studies and work supervision, recourse to 
national oonsultancy firms and cooperation between the latter and 
European consultanoy firms. 
2.5.2 The profile of the results fo~ teohnioal cooperation contracts ~ 
has an impact on the final statistical breakdown of all works,· aupply · 
and service contracts financed by the EDF in that it rebalances the latter 
somewhat.. The inclusion of this factor produces the following table for 
each of the three Funds~ 
All contracts 
Position at 31 December 1974 
. , 
,, 
'· 
r 
COUNTRY 1st EDF 2nd EDF 
Amount % Amount % 
Belgium 11 614 3.61 37 715 1·~~ 
France 211 496 43·29 213 444 41·59 
Germany 32 201 6.59 101 451 19·77 ,; 
' Italy 72 137 14.77 54 012 10.5? 
Luxembourg 1 484 0.30 3 476 o.68 
Netherlands 23 582 4·83 29 346 5·72 
AASM/OCT 129 623 26.53 73 200 14.26 
Third countries 409 o.o8 6oo 0.11 
' 
TOTAL 488 546 100 513 244 100 ;· 
1000 u.a • 
3rdEDF 
Amount % 
21 894 6.33 ,I 
1-53 419 44·32 
44 080 12.74 
45 185 13.05 f' 
4 556 1· 32 
9 257 2.67 •I 
64 341 18.59 
3 407 . 0.98 
346 139 100 " 
' 
1
The Ivory Coast firm, Sodepalm, was responsible for all supervision of 
the work, which cost 7. 7 million J.. a. 1. 
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This table should be oompared with that for all works and supply oontracts 
shown in Annex III. It confirms the value of the results achieved for 
the second EDF. Moreover, the improvement in the German share and the 
,, 
appreciable recovery of the Dutch share under the third EDF demonstrate 
the advantages of this "steaaying factor" available. to the Commission in 
respect of contracts where the development of the economic situation makes 
' 
the services offered by firms of certain ~ember States less competitive. 
~ ., " 
I 
' 
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To conclude this report stress should be laid on the great efforts made 
by the Commission to establish a.s clear and detailed a.rra.nsements a.s 
possible for competition and for access on equal t~rms to contracts 
financed by the EDF. 
To this end, it ha.s chosen a. pra.gma.tio method with two main objectives: 
i· To identify the discriminatory factors, whether de jure or de facto• 
which a.re liable to adversely affect competition in the participation of 
,firms; 
· ii. To draw up common rules for removing suoh distortions. 
During the first years of its· activity, the Commidsion observed the e 
reactions of the industries concerned a.nd then improved the instrument 
that it wa.s preparing for contacts With the la.ttet. It wa.s therefore· 
encouraged to see that the measures it had adopted had met with the 
approval of those concerned, since no-one had called in question their 
purpose or criticised their application. 
As to the results attained by these measures, it Should primarily be ~ 
stressed that the a.im of obtaining the best cost has been largely 
achieved. The response to invi ta.tions to tender, a.s regards both the 
number of participants a.nd the content and amount ot their tenders, shows 
that firms are seriously interested in EDF oontra.ots. 
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It can also be stated that, generally speaking, competition is keen: 
there have been very few occasions where the Associated States and the 
Commission, because of a lack of tenders or excessive prices, have had 
to restart the procedure by issuing a second invitation to tender or fall-
ing back on contracts by mutual agreement. 
As regaros the nationality balance of 'the contracts placed, the sucoess • 
~ 
of the measures taken by the Commission is not so clearly apparent. 
I 
As has repeatedly been emphasized, the results of th~ second Fund, which 
corresponds to the intensive phase in the working out of the competition 
standards, suggest that this FUnd is structurally the most balanced so 
far. It seems that for the third Fund, the anticipated effect of these 
arrangements a.nd of the new measures implemented has1 to a large · extent 
been distorted by the eoonomio, and particularly the~ monetary, disorders 
which occurred halfwq through tbe life of this Fun'li. 
J 
There is nothing to ind~ca.te that these measures will not once again prove 
their effectiveness in tbe long term. It should, however, be emphasized 
that the Community's action, apart from any effort made to counter the 
vagaries of the economic situation, comes up aga.inst·1 something of a 
"psychological" barrier in that it can have no control over the willingness 
i! 
of industry in all its forms to participate in the 'invitations to tender 
issued by the EDF. Although the Commission can establish a. framework 
a.nd instruments to ensure equal terms, it cannot easily overcome the. 
reluctance of certain European industrialists to commit· themselves to 
working in countries where the economic, sooial and climatic conditions 
a.re different from tbose u.sua.lly encountered in Europe. 
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This is also part of the reason why the guidelines adopted for implementing 
the fourth Fund reflect a greater effort to develope the national 
resources of the associated countries. In particular, the broadening 
of the aooelerated procedure for works contracts and the preferences 
granted to the works contractors and suppliers of the associated countries 
will be bound to produce new trends in the allocation of contracts under 
the Fund in particular by improving the balance of work between foreign 
firms and firms est~blished in the countries concerned. There is no 
doubt that in the past the search for such a balance was not one of the 
first priorities despite the need for it. ' 
The desire to make the field of competition increasingly wide and the 
stimulus given to international cooperation have even led the drafters 
of the new association convention to ~rovide for th~ possibility of thi~ 
countries participating in oontraots financed by the Community. Suoh 
participation will 'of course be of an exceptional ~ure, and will 
primarily be warranted by the desire to avoid an excessive increase in 
the cost of projects, by the Community contribution 'to the financing or·: 
regional or interregional cooperation schemes concerning third countries, 
and in oases of oofinanoing. 
It is nonetheless true that by thus making offioial 1 a practice in respect 
of which the Commission had alre~ granted a derogation·in certain cases, 
the drafters of. the new convention have accommodated a concern for efficiency 
and at the same time have met certain expectations on the part of the 
associated countries and the developing third countries. 
J 
'· ·' 
. \ 
L " 
~ 
I • 
' 
J I 
c, . . ·' .. -
I 
I 
r· 
r 
.! 
I 
' I 
t 
t 
I· 
I 
• 
.... 
.. 
, 
c. 
- 86-
' t 
VIII/7 b /'T 5-E 
'(P~"!' 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
- 87-
vn ll,"'~ r•'1f1 nVP.,..r .'TP. ""'n,,nt i nvo 1 '·'~~ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ • ........ ' ... . 
tfuJ"lhf'r 
11 
56 
97 
89 
85 
54 
0 
66 
95 
96 
116 
96 
63 
64' 
96 
82 
71 
• 
Tnt. ,q 1 ~mo•1rt 
1 699 327 
37 159 585 
62 523 089 
82 203 419 
113 896 071 
67 056 053 
62 207 068 
75 066 714 
103 684 339 
100 636 136 
78 641 267 
41 668 898 
105 612 866 
122 800 620 
107 958 741 
71 169 654 
' I 
" 
; 
n 
" 
" 
., 
" 
.. 
~V<>"!':'!~ 
154 484 
663 564 
664 568 
923 634 
1'1339 953 
1.241· 778 
n 
942 531 
790 175 
1.080045 
867 552 
819" 179 
'661 411 
1 650 201 
1 279 173 
1 316 570 
1 002 389 
" 
" 
llt "'·· 
. 
>I' ' 
! 
I 
I . 
' ' 
I 
" 
.. 
I ~ ! ' 
,• '. 
l 
I 
I 
\ 
I 
I j .,. 
j 
': 
i 
l 
·I • 
l 
I 
I 
y"PI\}? 
1959 
I 1960 
I 
l 
1961 
1962 
' ! 
' 
1963 
' 
i 
1964 
1965 
I 1966 
! 1967 : 
: 1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1~74 
..a 
-88-
AJiliEX. J T . 
(b.-.• type of ~ontrr>ct.) 
n •"' • 
.:Tl:r'Jl ~ 'l'TC'•·LS 'f'f• 'I'. ji p;·H !•'(•H SIIF P 1 Y HTVT'rtt•rTOH.;; 'ro 1t.l'i'NTn·'it li'llh'. •·b"'~F?Kfl nmrri1tiAC:•rs 
(~('\ilf'TO ~ f!·i~ 
-
•TnfTlhCn' ·~l"'t'!'ll ':!"01'11.t .:. .. ·,:(;~~"'=' rt'P Nnll"hP.,.. T0tP 1. P[!'n\Hlt It 'r~ r,. :'"fl 
1 30 000 30 000 10 1 669 327 166 933 
7 521 258 74 465 49 36.638 327 747 721 
47 8 334 399 177 328 50 54 188 690 1 083 774 
22 2 691 820 122 355 67 79 511 599 1 186 740 , 
29 13 192 466 . 454 912 56 100'703 605 1 798 278 
22 6 995 24_1 317 96,... 32 60 060 182 1 876 000 
' " 
23 6 370 931 276 997 43 55 S36 137 1 298 514 
53 10 067 514 189 953 .. .. 42 64 999 200 1 547 600 
58 ~7 028 153 293 588 l8 86·656 186 2 280 425 
67 18 822 193 280 928 49 81"813 943 '1 669 672 
63 19 860 478 Jl5 245 33 58"780 789 1 781 236 
: 
41 9 452 050 230 ·537' ,, 22 32 ~~6 848 l 464 4Q2 
25 6 941 150 277 S46 ' 39 98 671 716 2 530 044 
51 22 37P 669 438 641 45 100 429 951 2 231 716 
40 10 176 990 254 425 42 97 7,81 751 2 ~28 137 
26 12 327 600 474 238 45 58 ~ 054 1 ~07 601 
. 
" . 
"' 
r' 
r: 
• 
CO~Y 
~rr 
BEI.Sil.n 
F'R.A.mE 
ITM • ..., 
Lu.·:-~-
3,'l'l..J?.(r. 
lT:'!IF~~i-
I.uD-'3 
AJ...<:Ji!l0r;T 
~ 
, ~r;i rr-n~rr ~ 
·roTa 
-
l·JGRi(S C:OJT'W~C:TS 
(by mtior.LAlit:'' of .cc.nt'rA0t:::) 
. -
- 89-
~.NNRX JIT 
_ ... -·' ..... 
ReFmlt~ of ivtvit::!tinnP to t~l'lOer 
·••"" •- I • --- -·-•·••••• • • -· • f f f •--·. --'" 
.:)Uf'PLY r.ON'T'r. 1\!J'l':S 
< (b,"J ori;in of .r·oor:s) 
1 s+ -::])~ ~nd --~;!)li' 3rd T.:iW 1st 'l=J)F 2nri i'JlF 
1·fi101;r.t 'fo l~0~1~t % .t;rr.ount ~ i~:Ttount :" % A.;;,ount % 
13 475 3.41 59 637 8,26 22 941 10.26 9' 484 19.88 15 760 18,45 
.8 714 2.21 20 549 6.29 <11 226 5~02 2 451 5-14 1 254 8.49 
182 209 46.21 149 704 ~5.84 106 408 47.58 17 845 37.41 34 501 40.39 
57 637 ~4.62 26 507 8.11 30 266 13.54 4·703 9.86 13 321 15,60 
825 0,21 1884 0,58 1 320 0.59 6 0.01 31 0,04 
15 071 3.82 14 899 4.56 1 578 o. 70 3 388 7,10 4 673 5.47 
' - " 
p6 361 29.52 53 378 ~6.36 49 897 22.31 9 413 19.74 9 274 ~0.86 
- - - - - - 409 0.36 600 0. 70 
l394 292 100 326 558 100 223 636 100 47 699 100 85 414 100 
'000 u.~ • 
' 
ALL CONTRAC-TS 0 . -
' 
3rd ·i~DI1' lst T<JJT' 2nr. r:I.llt1 3-rd -EDF 
_"u;:ount 
'Jo ~ 1 .fl0ll':'lt % Hl!•OUnt % .'Ul·OUrlt ~ 
5 807 9.6j 22 959 5.19 75 397 .8.30 28 748 10._13 
2 643 4. 3/. 11 165 2.53 27 803 6 .. 75 13 869 4._89 
26 586 ~.1~ 
.. 
200 054 ~5.26 l84 205 44.71 132 ·994 46 • .85 
4 693 7.79 62 340 4.10 39 828 9.67 34 959 12.31 
1 929 3 •. 2C 831 0.19 1 915 0,46 3 249 1.15 
2 521 4.19 18 459 4.18 19 572 4. 75 4 099 1..4-4 
12 652 21.00 125 774 28..4E 62 652 5.21 62 549 22,03 
3 407 5.65 409 0.09 600 0.15 3 407 1.20 
60 238 100 441 991 100 411']72 100 283 874 100 
- -..,.....-..... ---~---..-- ~- ·---~----------- ·-~-~--~-~ --- - .. ·-·-- ·-·-~-----··----.--,~ ·--. 
a - "" 
. ·' ,, 
~ 
.. 
-90 
A100.X IV 
Breakdo•m of tend.er~ for v10rks contracts and uorks contrco.cts placed ur.der the 3rd JI.J)F1 
rni lLl :i. on < < 0 to 1 u.::o. - I :E'rRACTS 
lfi!R1.-:S i'pP. YH=! P. rs l'!nntr;:;r,ts n1::.cen TPnn~,..R 
(nun't'<?r) - (n.1mber) 
Nnrr>h<>T' 'T'otP 1 ...... m,_llt 
. 
( ' ()(';(\ 11 .• :" • 
- GR11!Jtt 6 0 1 ' 301~.-~w.: -5 
ilELGIUI~ 3 
- -
3 
i'HAiiCE 65 12 6 602 70 
lli'.ALY. 8 4 1 783 6 
Jnix:Er<!:OOURG 
- - -
1 
Rfilb':!:RL.A.t'IDS 3 
- -
1 
JASH/OCT 149 49 ,1~ 410 .. _ .. , .. - ,,32 
. 
iJ!iLTI- 12 4 1 956 15 
-~"PT r.~-r U i:. 
1Tn:is t~b1P- r:nve:r:=: o-nl:• r:or.rt.:rf~"t:-; fin:-:>nr.f>c -i'r-nr: t.r.~ 
nrtl;r t,~·~ tr':)~ s!:r'T'P ·~~·~~ ·r.~r.,, T.nl ... ~n -i_-rtto,. ?r~n,1nt. 
; 
+.o 3 rn.j ll; on =,l. :'1 • 0 - ~ 
!;n~T.1"':1~"t.G nl::.("'f'n Tenc'IP.rs 
( "l'l!" hP. ... ) 
N'n!TibP.r Tnt(] ror~nnt 
'000 n. r-.• 
- -
11 
-
- -
4 
14 20 306 41 
- -
14 
- - -
- -
1 
9 10 444 6 
12 20 310 25 
VIIIhB/75-E 
'3 mtlliCD u.a. - -
Contracts placed 
1\T,, TR be -r 'Tht."' 1 ::>Jr.f>nnt 
(t('()(l ll. p. )· 
1 3 586 
-
- -
-~ 
8 39 648 
2 13 464 
- -
- -
1 4 024 
5 52 923 
r,r:)rtPi'n r.~·:l .;;f"t:r 
' 
r.o ~-:-;-r,J P. r:rm 0 T.O 
. 
?·1lTLrrTiiJ"Afi1!0N/I IS Tenders 
(number) 
~'RABCEJGFRl•1 ArTY ' 
-
~CE/Rr.:Tf-JUTtl" 3 
~EjiTALY 1 
~liCE,/LUXE!,(EOURQ 
-
tFRIJlCEf ~T..ANDS 
-
~CE,k4S111-0CT 6 
BELGIUM/GER.I:LUTY 
-. .. 
fBEI.G w-~/rT~J.Y 
-
w.un:m·rfa.!s~ 1 
r.ERM !NY /Ji"!T'Hf.P. T ·A.'NlX: 1 
~TALY/A"s;,r 
-
• i~Tf~T.AJ·Tll)/AAS~!: 
-
FRJ_NC!F./GDn.7 !, irrj . 
-WJ ,C:TIJi'.i c; • 
--
--
~pE!rr-..,:m t.":JY I . 
-rr-:'t'}G·P.I.tJM 
r'R AJTGR/ G-=-?~NTY I -A A;:"'):., 
PRANC!~/ITI\LY h-4..'31·'- -
'f;":iPJi:PJrl/ITAI.Y/. 
-?.~({1·1 
Bn.rnmJiif.'1LY /A.J...S_ . 
-
. 
:-t .l'..iicrr/nHR!~f.,l'IY/_, 
R~.T.I}J~tT,rjAAXM - -
.. 
- ~1 -
ANNEX V 
J1reakim:m_af q,o.ntr51ds nlP.("'!"d t-riJ.!!. inn1~.;nr~tion,l~ 
1 millirn u.n. 1 to 3 r:n!. 1. :i.on Ue:'l• 
_Gont"'~~tR nlP.("'~t1 C:ont,.,~rt.R nl~ron TendP-rs Nu.-nber Total cunount Hmnber Total al!lounl 
f • nnn n e~._ ( numbP.r) (_ •_QQQ_ u_._P. • .) 
- -
2 2 4-171 
1 . 802 3 2 2 933 
1 398 2 2 2 886 
- -
1 1 1 140 
- - - - -
1 426 6 3 5 146 
- - - - -
- - - - -
' , 
- - - - -
1 -330 
- - -
- -
1 1 2 668 
- -
1 1 1 366 
-
- - - -- --
, . 
= :;:1 -
\ 
- - - - -
\ 
-
---
-
1 
- -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
:::1 l ~ . 
-
, .,_ -.... 
: 
"-
-.. 
- - - - -
VIII/7A/7r:;-'R •· 
3 mi_l.tio,rl_ u.a. 
~1"\r'lt ~::-rt~ T'-1 ::or.M.. 
'rrmdP.rs Number Totnl amourt (mlr.lber) ( •noo _ll .:P.) 
8 1 4 ()()() 
- - -
' 
> 
1 
- -
1 
- -
1 
- -
2 
- -
1 
- -
2 1 1 174 
. '.> -
- - -
. 
- - -
- - -
- - -
1 
- -
. 
2 
- -
2 1 20 47J 
1 
- -
1 
- -
1 1 11 OS, 
~ 
• 1 1 10 18; 
"» 
i 
' 
- 92-
,!!1-_BLE OF CONTENTS 
I 
I 
VI!I/78/75-E 
" 
• ~,. "; 1 ' ~.; • , 
- 93- VIII/78/75-E 
Pages 
INTRODUCTION 1 
CHAPTER I: Principles adopted for organizing invitation to 
tender procedures 7 
1.1 Codification of the rules applicable to EDF contraots 11 
1.2 Principles for the preparation of invitation to 
tender dossiers 16 
1. 2.1 
1.2.2 
1.3.2 
Documents contained in the in~itation to terider 
dossier 
Neutrality of the contract specifioations 
Method of preparin~ invitatioh to tender dossiers 
Principles involved in the procedure for issuing 
invitations to tender 
Information measures 
~,blicizing of projects 
Publicizing of invitations to tender 
Publication of the results of invitations tp tender 
Time limit for the submission of tenders 
,, 
Programmine of invitations to tender 
Measures taken to rationalize the presentation of 
invitation to tender dossiers 
Standardizing invitation to tender dossiers 
Grouping or splitting services into lots 
... 
t 
I 
• 
17 
18 
19 
21 
22 
22 
23 
26 
26 
27 
28 
29 
31 
, 
I 
I 
I 
t 
l' 
f , 
I ; 
! 
I 
I 
! 
' [ 
" 
l 
! 
l 
I 
' i ... 
t 
I 
I 
! 
I 
t ~ 
t . 
i 
i 
f 
I 
I 
! 
! 
I 
I 
I 
i 
1.' 
I 
I 
I 
I 
" 
f. 
l 
~ 
........ 
, ..... 
I 
!' 
. ! 
I 
t 
l 
I 
1.5.1 
1.5.2 
1.5.3 
1·5·3·1 
1.6 
1.6.1 
1.6.2 
1.7.2 
- 94- VIII/78/75-E 
Rules r,overnin~ selection of the contractor 
Arrangements for selecting the contractor 
Selection criteria 
Evaluation and comparison of tenders 
34 
34 
35 
36 
Currency of tender 37 
rraxation 38 
Transport 39 
Measures to ensure a bal::mced sharing of work 
between firms established in the country con~erned 
and foreign firms 41 
Cooper at ion botl'leen firms 42 
) 
Protecting the economies of the associated countries 44 
as regards works contracts 44 
as regards supply contracts 46 
Rules for the performance of contracts to ensure 
indirectly that the terms are equal 47 
Aid to firms' finances 48 
Speeding up p~yment procedures 
1.7.3 Limiting the suppliers' commercial guarantees 
50 
52 
CHAPTER 2: Statistical analysis 
2 .1.1 
2.1.2 
2.2 
Development of the rate and volume of inv~tatione 
to tender 
General trends 
Analysis 
Results of invitations to tender 
General structure of contract distribution 
I 
I 
54 
55 
55 
56 
60 
60 
- 95 - VIII/78/75 ... E 
Main trends for each EDF 62 
Influences of works contracts 63 
Breakdown of works contracts - ana~ysis of 
contracts placed and participation levels 
(3rd EDF) 64 
Size of contra.cts 64 
Analysis of contracts placed 66 
Contracts placed with single firms or firms 
forming part of one-country consortia 66 
Contracts placed with multinationals 69 
Analysis of participation levels 
Participation of single firms and firms 
forming part of one-country consortia 
1 
Participation of multinationals 
Breakdown of supply contracts 
Results 
Interpretation 
" Technical cooperation contracts 
71 
72 
72 
73 
73 
74 
78 
CONCLUSION 
ANNEXFS: 
I. Trend of invitations to tender in terms of number, 
volume and average amount involved (works and 
supplies) . 87 
II. Trend of invitations to tender in terms of nUJilber, 
volume and average amount involved (by type of 
contract) I 88 
III. Results of invitations to tender 89 
IV. Breakdown of tenders for works contracts and works 
contracts placed under the 3rd EDF 90. 
v. Breakdown of contracts placed with multinationals 91 
I 
\ 
I 
I 
r 
1 
t 
t 
• t . 
I 
f 
I 
t 
I 
; l 
I 
,, 
l 
! 
.l 
! 
.I 
..,..,, 
--.; 
l' 
l 
t 
i 
----···--····-····-··-··· ...... ,, ., ~., ............ ..-,y ... ~ ........ , ..... , •1"!!'!Pf-¥1""'·....,_---
 
 
